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Despite business rescue being approximately ten–years–old with several court judgments 
available in South Africa, certain legal terminology in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the 
2008 Act’) are still ambiguous. This study includes an overview of the old administration to 
emphasise that the issue could have been resolved in the 2008 Act.  
Under the novel regime, it is the task of the business rescue practitioner to temporarily 
administer the assets and dealings of the business by restructuring the business, property, 
debt, other liabilities, and equity (section 128(1)(b)). The objective would be to either emerge 
from the process solvent or a better return for creditors (or immediate liquidation as a final 
route). However, the two built-in requirements, namely, the company must be ‘in financial 
distress’, and there must be a 'reasonable prospect’ of success, is unclear as the 2008 Act does 
not provide what standard of proof is required in these instances.  
Accordingly, this study analyses the two gateways into business rescue and the 
abovementioned requirements to begin the process. It is suggested that the general 
moratorium and post-commencement finance and the implications in practically executing 
the statutory obligations be considered concurrently. 
Thereafter, this study includes a discussion on South African Airways, the first state-
owned entity to be placed under voluntary business rescue on 5 December 2019. 
The study concludes by recommending methods that the court and a business rescue 
practitioner could utilise in interpreting the requirements for the process to be more effective. 
For example, the courts and a business rescue practitioner may use a pre-assessment for 
determining ‘financial distress’ together with financial and cash-flow ratios. For ‘reasonable 
prospect’, a pre-assessment is recommended, as well as an opportunity analysis (OA) and a 




CHAPTER 1  
I BACKGROUND                                                                      
(a) Introduction 
Historically, South African companies had only three options for saving businesses 
experiencing gradual deterioration. First, s 427 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘1973 Act’) 
governed the procedure for judicial management.1 Secondly, s 311 of the 1973 Act made 
provision for an offer of compromise or a scheme of arrangement. Lastly, a non–statutory, 
informal disposition without court intervention.2 
Since 1926, a formal corporate rescue procedure was initiated in South Africa under 
the Companies Act 46 of 1926 and judicial management was subsequently adapted in the 
1973 Act with little amendments.3 The latter was further developed in the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 (‘2008 Act’) and referred to as business rescue, which is the refreshing option that 
replaced judicial management.4 
The new statutory regime can be found under Chapter 6 ‘Business rescue and 
compromises with creditors’ within the 2008 Act.5 A new legislative provision to replace 
judicial management with a dispensation aligning South African company law in line with 
international economic principles of corporate rescue was needed.6  Due to the 1973 Act not 
making enough provision for companies in financial distress, the only alternative available to 
these companies was liquidation, which resulted in their management looking internationally 
at options to restructure their affairs.7  
 
1  D Gewer ‘Legal aspects of turnarounds’ in N Harvey Turnaround management & Corporate Renewal 
 – A South African Perspective (2011) 560; P T J Bezuidenhout A review of business rescue in South 
 Africa since implementation of the Companies Act (71/2008) (unpublished MBA thesis, North–West 
 University, 2012) 8.      
2  Ibid.  
3  A Loubser ‘Business Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of a Home?’ (2007) 40(1) CILSA 
 153. 
4  Ibid. 
5  O Mokoena ‘The Philosophy of Business Rescue Law’ (2019) 5(1) Journal of Corporate and 
 Commercial Law & Practice 3. 
6  P Kloppers ‘Judicial Management – A corporate rescue mechanism in need of reform?’ (1999) 10 Stell 
 LR 434. 
7  E Levenstein An Appraisal of the New South African Business Rescue Procedure (published LLD 
 thesis, University of Pretoria, 2015) 52. 
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According to legal scholars in the corporate insolvency space, financial distress is 
commonly viewed as an ‘exogenous development’.8 They believe the situation is as a result 
of outside factors that hold a company back from discharging its quick assets to satisfy their 
obligations.9 For this reason, the United States (‘US’) Congress adopted the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, which influenced the 2008 Act by stressing restructuring as opposed to 
liquidation.10 They highlighted the concern of preserving employment, assets, and the law, by 
allowing companies trouble–free protection under Chapter 11.11 
Essentially, Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code favours a more ‘debtor–friendly 
approach’, and which by the same token, the 2008 Act tried to accomplish. In 2004, the 
‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’ is 
a policy paper published by the Department of Trade and Industry (‘DTI’). The DTI 
expressed their efforts to align South Africa with other contemporary corporate–rescue 
regimes.12 It recognises the relationship between a debtor and creditor which, under this plan, 
could encompass a decrease in the debtor’s financial obligations.13  
In essence, the judicial management provisions only made a moratorium available 
where a ‘reasonable probability’ was established, and this basically overlooked the global 
reality that creditors may rather accept a reduced payment of debt than none at all.14 It is of 
more value to the creditor to have the debtor in operation, rather than placing them into 
liquidation, which results in the discontinuation of that company.15 Hence, there was a need 
for a business rescue, which called for an agreement with the majority of creditors assenting 
to place the ailing company under the plan, allowing for business dealings to resume as 
normal. 16 
The purpose of business rescue is to aid and effectively rescue financially distressed 
companies, together with balancing the rights and interests of all stakeholders involved, 
which was not effective in the old regime.17 The process is intended to provide a reasonable 
balance between the interests of the debtor company and the creditors themselves. The former 
 
8  M Bradley & M Rosenzweig ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 11’ (1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 1043–
 1044.  
9  Ibid.  
10  Ibid. Chapter 11 of the U S Bankruptcy Code refers to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as 
 amended. 
11  Ibid. 
12  H Rajak & J Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ (1999) 116 SALJ 286. 
13  GN 1183 GG 26493 of 23 June 2004 at 45. 
14  Rajak & Henning op cit note 12 at 286. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid.  
17  Section 7(k) of Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘2008 Act’). 
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is given the opportunity to prepare a rescue plan with some protection from action by 
creditors and the latter have a right to vote on the plan.18 
There are two gateways to bringing an application, namely, the board of directors 
(‘BOD’) of the company may pass a resolution to place the company under business rescue;19 
or an affected party may apply to court.20 The application by the board is a simple procedure 
entailing notification to the concerned parties and the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission of South Africa (‘CIPC’).21 In the event of a company looking to abuse the 
process, by using the moratorium to avoid creditors’ claims, an affected party can respond by 
making an application to set aside such claims.22  
For a court to grant an application for business rescue, specific requirements need to 
be satisfied. For voluntary business rescue, the board of the company must satisfy the court 
that it is in financial distress, and a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company exists.23 An 
affected party would have to make an order to court, with the satisfaction of the above pre–
conditions or alternative requirements, including: the company’s inability to pay an amount 
for public regulation; contractual obligation; or where it is just and equitable for financial 
reasons.24            
(b) Rationale                                                                                                                                                         
This study aims to explore, inter alia, the requirements to commence business rescue in terms 
of Chapter 6, and to emphasise those areas that have proven to be problematic considering 
previous outcomes. One of these requirements is the concept of ‘reasonable prospect’, which 
is a key provision for determining whether business rescue may be viable. 
The study of business rescue is a novel and topical concept in South Africa as it is a 
mechanism that aims to solve economic predicaments, achieve commercial pursuits, and 
rejuvenate financially distressed companies.  
Additionally, after analysing the requirements to commence business rescue, this 
study investigates how they apply to state–owned enterprises (‘SOEs’). The role and 
functions of SOEs are regulated in the new Companies Act and the Public Finance 
 
18  J Rushworth ‘A critical analysis of the business rescue regime in the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 
 (2010) Acta Juridica 275. 
19  Section 129(1) of the 2008 Act.  
20  Section 131(4) of the 2008 Act. 
21  See http://www.cipc.co.za/index.php/publications/business-rescue/, accessed on 12 July 2020. 
22  Section 130(1)(a)(i–iii) of the 2008 Act. 
23  Section 129(1)(a–b) of the 2008 Act. 
24  Section 131(4)(a)(i–iii) of the 2008 Act. 
4 
Management Act.25 South African Airways (‘SAA’) was ‘financially distressed’ in both 
instances of this definition at the time the business rescue process was invoked, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
Likewise, for a SOE to succeed in an application for business rescue, the requirement 
of financial distress would need to be satisfied. Conventionally, the boards of SOEs have 
relied on state–guaranteed funding (from the National Treasury) and have the option of 
guarantees to reduce the risk of being financially distressed in terms of s 128(1) of the 2008 
Act.26 Cassim raises the question of whether ‘business rescue is available to companies that 
are already insolvent?’27 This was after SAA entered into business rescue but was factually 
insolvent, with its liabilities exceeding its assets by almost R 13 billion.28 
Moreover, the contention that SOEs who continue to rely on government guarantees 
may still be regarded as being in a state of financial distress would depend on ‘whether or not 
state guarantees can ensure that all the debts due by the company can be repaid, or whether 
certain creditors will remain unpaid.’29 
Historically, we have not witnessed any SOE that has experienced the business rescue 
process until SAA was placed under voluntary business rescue during early December of 
2019.30 Hence, there is uncertainty surrounding the prospects for SOEs under this procedure. 
Many trade unions are in support of the restructuring to preserve jobs and avoid 
privatisation of the SOE with the ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC) 
reinforcing this. However, economists Roodt and Abedian believe that SAA cannot be saved, 
and placing them into business rescue would have the effect of more guarantees and more 
taxes.31 Abedian adds that incrementally, fuel levy, sin taxes, and the income tax will also 
rise.32 Levenstein believes that the process would be beneficial for distressed SOEs as it 
allows them to come out as solvent at the end of the process, protects employment, and that 
 
25  1 of 1999 (‘PFM Act’). 
26  E Levenstein ‘South Africa’s state–owned enterprises: prime candidates for business rescue?’ (2018) 
 Without Prejudice available at https://www.withoutprejudice.co.za/publication/2018/October/articles, 
 accessed on 15 July 2020. 
27  M F Cassim ‘South African Airways makes an emergency landing into business rescue: Some burning 
 issues’ (2020) 137(2) SALJ 201.   
28  ‘South African Airways lost over $700 mln in past 2 years’ available at https://www.dailymaverick
 .co.za/article/2019-12-02-south-african-airways-lost-over-700-mln-in-past-2-yearsdocuments/, 
 accessed on 18 July 2020. 
29  Levenstein op cit note 26.  
30  Ibid. 
31  S Mkhwanazi ‘Economists slam ANC inaction on SOEs’ IOL News 27 January 2020 available at 
 https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/economists-slam-anc-inaction-on-soes41414943-, accessed on 10 
 July 2020.  
32  Ibid.  
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SOEs are ‘prime candidates’ for this process.33 Furthermore, this make–or–break moment 
could serve as a lesson and option for other SOEs (such as SABC and ESKOM) in financial 
distress.  
(c) Research questions  
This study outlines the development of the new Companies Act as a corporate rescue 
procedure against the requirements under s 427(1) of the 1973 Act, and some of the 
shortcomings experienced with the new regime are analysed.  
The study mainly focuses on the requirements for a board resolution to commence 
business rescue proceedings in terms of s 129(1) of the 2008 Act and a compulsory 
application in terms of s 131(4) of the 2008 Act. The main requirements are then evaluated 
against the background of the shortcomings experienced with judicial management. 
In conjunction with the purpose of this study, the following questions are examined: 
(1)  Whether the requirements for business rescue have resulted in the successful 
 implementation of business rescue? 
(2)  How can the problematic requirements be neutralised?  
(3)  How are the requirements applied in light of SOEs? 
(d) Research methodology   
A desk–based research methodology is adopted for the purposes of this study and several 
resources are consulted. The dissertation reviews previous research findings in order to gain a 
broad understanding of the field. The research comprises of both primary and secondary 
sources in print and electronic format.  
(e) Anticipated limitations  
This study focuses on the main legislative requirements to commence business rescue in 
terms of ss 129(1)(a–b) and ss 131(4)(a)(i–iii) of the 2008 Act. This study also mentions s 
133 (the general moratorium) and s 135 (post–commencement finance) of the 2008 Act, as 
they relate to the aforementioned requirements. 
 
33  Levenstein op cit note 26. 
6 
(f) Overview of chapters 
This dissertation is structured into four chapters, in order to enable a critical discussion on 
whether there have been significant developments in terms of business rescue in South 
Africa. Chapter 1 is an introduction that provides a brief overview of the development of 
business rescue in South Africa. It includes the research questions, objectives, significance of 
the study, its limitations, research methodology, and the chapter outline.   
Chapter 2 follows an analysis of the requirements of the 2008 Act against the 
backdrop of the 1973 Act. More specifically, reference is made to the inadequacy 
experienced with judicial management. The aim is to discuss the requirements in terms of ss 
129(1)(a–b) and ss 131(4)(a)(i–iii) of the 2008 Act. Regardless of the path taken, the 
challenges relating to ‘financial distress’, ‘reasonable prospect’, and the possible solutions 
submitted would apply in both instances. 
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the current and first SOE under the process, SAA, 
and subsequently the extent to which the requirements were satisfied, together with the 
implications of a general moratorium and post–commencement finance. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview on the shortcomings of business rescue with 
recommendations that can be implemented in order to improve the business process.  
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CHAPTER 2 
I JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT IN TERMS OF THE COMPANIES ACT 61 
OF 1973 
(a) Introduction  
In retrospect, the Companies Act 46 of 1926 introduced judicial management and this marked 
South Africa as being one of the earliest countries to initiate a corporate rescue system.1       
There were various commissions of enquiry that resulted in little revision of the Act. Some 
amendments occurred in 1932,2 and the Lansdown Commission introduced some changes, 
followed by reports of the Millin Commission in 1952.3 During 1972, the masters of the 
supreme court wanted judicial management to be abolished because of the minor degrees of 
success. However, the Van Wyk de Vries Commission reflected on establishing the 
Companies Act which was later retained under the 1973 Act. Consequently, Olver, Rajak and 
Henning4 highlight that, at the time, under twenty per cent of the applications were successful 
and suggested that in order to avoid the abuse of the process it should be ultimately 
removed.5 
The 1973 Act requirements stated when and how a distressed company might initiate 
the process to commence the proceedings: there must be mismanagement; or the inability to 
pay debts; or meets obligations.6 Subsequently, the company must be failing to become a 
successful concern. If placed under the process, there is a reasonable probability that it can 
discharge its debts and obligations, hence, become a successful concern. Furthermore, the 
court may grant an order if it finds it just and equitable to do so.7 
 
1  H Rajak & J Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ (1999) 116 SALJ 265.   
2  Ibid. The fundamental changes were a section for a moratorium on claims by creditors and the 
 principles of impeachable transactions to apply also to judicial management. 
3  D A Burdette ‘Some initial thoughts on the development of a modern and effective business rescue 
 model for South Africa (part 1)’ (2004) 16 SA Merc 246. 
4  A H Olver Judicial management in South Africa (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 
 1980). See also Rajak & Henning op cit note 1 at 266.   
5  Ibid. 
6  Section 427(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘1973 Act’).  
7  Section 427(1)(b) of the 1973 Act. 
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(b) Limitations of the 1973 Act 
To provide some context as to why reform was needed, the main limitations of the 1973 Act 
need to be addressed. First, judicial management was time–consuming as opposed to 
liquidation and was regarded as an ‘extraordinary’ process.8 Accordingly, the requirements of 
proving a ‘reasonable probability’ was more difficult for the company, and improbable, 
considering the short timelines and the pressure of creditors.9  
Burdette10 submits that ‘reasonable probability’ should have instead been phrased as 
‘reasonable prospect’ or ‘reasonable possibility’.11 The other requirement that needed to be 
satisfied was that the company must have already been insolvent.12 Kloppers13 argues the 
contrary by submitting that a company would be better positioned to restructure and avoid 
liquidation if it takes early steps to prevent the entrapment of insolvency.14 If the latter 
requirement was satisfied, the provision of ‘just and equitable’ would have still needed to be 
established. Despite the phrase (just and equitable) not being defined, the courts consider the 
rights and interest of all parties in order to determine this prerequisite.15  
Secondly, aside from the flawed requirements to commence judicial management, the 
cost to initiate it only added to the expenses of the distressed company.16 This financial 
barrier was even more exclusionary for small–medium businesses.17 Thirdly, the 1973 Act 
does not apply to partnerships, business trusts, or close corporations (‘CCs’).18 In Tobacco 
Auctions Ltd v AW Hamilton (Pvt) (Ltd),19  the court stated that apart from the size of a 
company one must assess the business performance, asset holdings, the complexity of the 
issue experienced, and its liabilities.20 Kloppers21 submits that, this assessment could have 
been a reference to determining the requirement of ‘just and equitable’.22 
 
8  Burdette op cit note 3 at 247. 
9  C Stein & G Everingham The new Companies Act unlocked (2011) 409. 
10  D A Burdette ‘Unified Insolvency Legislation in South Africa: Obstacles in the Path of the Unification 
 Process’ (1999) 32 De Jure 44 at 58. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Burdette op cit note 3 at 250. 
13  P Kloppers ‘Judicial management reform: Steps to initiate a business rescue’ (2001) 13 SA Merc 359 
14  Ibid. 
15  P M Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 5ed (Service issue 33) (2011) 923. 
16  Kloppers op cit note 13 at 371. 
17  Rajak & Henning op cit note 1 at 268. 
18  Burdette op cit note 3 at 250. 
19  1966 (2) SA 451 (R) at 453 (‘Tobacco Auctions’).  
20  Ibid. 
21  Kloppers op cit note 13 at 371. 
22  Ibid. 
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Fourthly, the main reasons why restructuring was unsuccessful was that the process 
included courts, which translated to the legal procedures being time–consuming and costly, 
and this was more burdening to companies in financial distress. Fifthly, Gewer23 states that, 
the judicial managers who replaced the directors of a company did not have the necessary 
skills to save the distressed companies.24 Finally, according to Roodt,25 judicial management 
was impractical and had a negative effect on the goodwill of the company, he described the 
outcome of the procedure as the ‘kiss of death’.26 
(c) Business rescue in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
The outbreak of the Covid–19 pandemic has led many countries, including South Africa, into 
a national lockdown, which has increased the loss of jobs and decreased the levels of 
economic production.27 This international pandemic could mean the end of many companies 
as they are unable to meet their financial obligations and are left with the only one option, 
liquidation.28  
Considering that this route is final, it may not be the best option for some companies 
experiencing temporary financial difficulty. Alternatively, Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act is the 
next option for companies in financial distress.29 In some instances, failing companies should 
naturally be liquidated in competing markets when dominated by tough rivals, and this, in 
turn, prevents the business rescue process from potential abuse and presents the consumer 
with the best goods and services.30 
Business rescue intends on reviving the company by staying creditors’ claims, and 
liquidation applications after business rescue has commenced via the creation of a 
moratorium.31 A registered and qualified business rescue practitioner (‘BRP’) is appointed to 
 
23  D Gewer ‘Legal aspects of turnarounds’ in N Harvey Turnaround management & Corporate Renewal 
 – A South African Perspective (2011).  
24  Ibid. 
25  J Roodt ‘Business rescue under the new Companies Act is an improvement over judicial management: 
 The strengths and weaknesses of business rescue under the new Companies Act’ available at 
 http://www.roodtinc.com/archive/newsletter78.asp, accessed on 20 August 2020. 
26  Ibid. 
27  K Timoney & P J Veldhuizen ‘Insolvency and restructuring in the post–pandemic world: The role of 
 liquidation and business rescue’ (2020) 10(1) CR 25.  
28  Ibid at 28. 
29  Ibid. 
30  D Davies (ed), W Geach (ed) & T Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures in South 
 Africa 3ed (2013) 235. 
31  Section 133(1) of the 2008 Act. 
10 
temporarily administer the assets and dealings of the business. The ultimatum would be the 
development and implementation of the business rescue plan (‘BR plan’), when approved, to:  
‘Restructure its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and equity in a manner 
that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, if 
it is not possible for the company to so continue in existence, results in a better return for the 
company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the 
company.’32 
The purpose of business rescue is to aid and effectively rescue financially distressed 
companies, together with balancing the rights and interests of all stakeholders involved, 
which was not effective in the old regime.33 According to Rushworth,34 the process is 
intended to provide a reasonable balance between the interests of the debtor–company and 
the creditors themselves. The former is allowed to prepare a BR plan with some protection 
from action by creditors, and the latter have a right to vote on the BR plan.35 
There are two gateways to bringing an application: the BOD of the company may pass 
a resolution (known as ‘board resolution’ or ‘voluntary commencement’) to place the 
company under business rescue;36 or an affected party may apply to the court (known as a 
‘court application’ or ‘compulsory application’).37  
For a voluntary business rescue to commence, the board of the company must satisfy 
the court that it is in financial distress, and that a ‘reasonable prospect’ of rescuing the 
company exists.38 An affected party would have to make an order to court, with the 
satisfaction of the above pre–conditions, or alternative requirements, including the company’s 
inability to pay an amount for public regulation, contractual obligation, or where it is just and 
equitable for financial reasons.39  
Despite business rescue being approximately ten–years–old with several court 
judgments available in South Africa, there is still uncertainty around legal terminology being 
defined in the Companies Act of 2008. The two built–in requirements are mainly discussed as 
they apply for both commencement by a board resolution and court application.  
 
32  Section 128(1)(b)(iii) of the 2008 Act.  
33  Section 7(k) of the 2008 Act.  
34  J Rushworth ‘A critical analysis of the business rescue regime in the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 
 (2010) Acta Juridica 275. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Section 129(1) of the 2008 Act. 
37  Section 131(4) of the 2008 Act. 
38  Section 129(1)(a–b) of the 2008 Act. 
39  Section 131(4)(a)(i–iii) of the 2008 Act. 
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(i) The company must be in financial distress  
In assessing whether a company is financially distressed, a company must either be 
‘commercially insolvent’ whereby the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or 
is presumably ‘factually insolvent’ in that the company’s liabilities exceed its assets at any 
time. Factual and commercial insolvency has been recognised as the two forms of insolvency 
for decades in our law.40 In both instances, the time frame is within the next six months.41 It 
excludes insolvent companies to rationalise that imminent insolvency must be ‘diagnosed and 
treated at an early stage before the condition becomes incurable.’42 In Gormley v West City 
Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd,43 Traverso DJP highlighted that 
‘the Act envisages a short–term approach to the financial position of the company. This is so 
for self–evident reasons. There must be a measure of certainty in the commercial world. 
Creditors cannot be left in a state of flux for an indefinite period. The provisions of the Act 
make it clear that the concept of business rescue only applies to companies which are 
financially distressed as defined in the Act.’44 
The 2008 Act does not define what is meant by either terms ‘solvent–’ or ‘insolvent 
company’. However, in Boschpoort Ondernemings (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd45 the supreme 
court of appeal (‘SCA’) has indicated that, business rescue may commence if one of the two 
forms of insolvency occur. In Murray v African Global Holdings (Pty) Ltd,46 Wallis JA states 
that, in determining commercial insolvency, the current and imminent financial standing of 
the company must be considered in examining its ability to pay its debts and remain trading 
within those periods.47 The court assumed that the vague concepts could be in relation to the 
judicial interpretations of solvency and insolvency being effective and ensuring that ‘sensible 
and business–like’ outcomes persist in determining their meanings.48 
There are two tests in determining financial distress. According to Rushworth,49 the 
first test (cash–flow insolvency) relates to the inability to pay debts, which is stricter as it is 
 
40  2014 (2) SA 518 (SCA) (‘Boschpoort’) para 16. 
41  Section 128(1)(f)(i–ii) of the 2008 Act. 
42  F H I Cassim (ed), M F Cassim, R Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 862. 
43  (2012) ZAWCHC 33 (‘Gormley’). 
44  Ibid para 11. 
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quite clear from the companies’ inability to pay its debts from its financial resources.50 The 
second test (balance–sheet insolvency) is where the liabilities exceed the assets.51 There may 
be other aspects that prevent a proper evaluation. For example, whether a guarantee of 
another company would be treated as a liability.52 The test pertains to a daily record of the 
financial affairs which is not commonly organised by businesses and suggests that where the 
sustainability of a company is questioned, directors must prepare balance–sheets regularly.53 
Moreover, when a company first experiences financial distress, it would be eligible to 
apply for business rescue according to Welman v Marcelle Props,54 whereby ‘distressed’ 
relates to an ‘ailing’ company and not the ‘terminally ill’ nor the ‘chronically ill’.55  
In Merchant West Workings Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and 
Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd56 Kgomo J states that, the difference with the 2008 Act and 
the 1973 Act is that a company that is already insolvent should instead be liquidated rather 
than placed under business rescue proceedings.57 
Rogers J in Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd58 opposes 
the above judgment by stating that  
‘[the definition of] financially distressed under section 128(1) of the 2008 Act creates a 
threshold. Current commercial or factual insolvency is not a pre–condition. This is 
understandable. But it does not follow that, because the company is already financially 
distressed, it can no longer be subject to business rescue. This interpretation would be 
inconsistent with s 5(1)59 together with s 7(d)60 and (k)61 as it would oblige the court to 
liquidate a company even though there might be a reasonable prospect of rescue.’62 
Furthermore, he expresses the view that a company that is factually insolvent, yet 
commercially solvent, should be regarded as being in financial distress within the meaning of s 
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128(1)(f)(ii)63 and relied on the SCA judgement in Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd,64 where the court found no reason to treat factual 
insolvency indifferently and considered current commercial insolvency as financial distress.65 
Cassim66 submits that the elementary question in deciding financial distress is 
whether the company’s business is ‘viable’ and in assessing factual insolvency, courts are 
required to adopt a holistic approach in evaluating whether or not the company is insolvent or 
approaching insolvency.67 The ‘twin test’ of cash–flow insolvency (commercial insolvency) 
and balance–sheet insolvency (factual insolvency) should be determined side by side.68 
In general, the requirement for financial distress is an upgrade from the 1973 Act, 
which required proof of the company already being insolvent. Nevertheless, the financial 
planning of a company is usually carried over to the subsequent year, and it is submitted that 
for a business to be preemptive and guard against financial risks, or imminent crisis, the 
anticipation of these events occurring must be changed from six months to twelve months 
before exercising claims.69 This is particularly relevant considering the ongoing (Covid–19) 
pandemic at present.  
Furthermore, Loubser70 argues that, a consequence due to the uncertainty around the 
determination of financial distress is when directors run the risk of personal liability when their 
level of understanding the company’s financial distress does not match the court’s finding. In 
fear of their judgement resulting in this, they consider liquidation.71 Levenstein72 suggests that, 
the BOD should consider the nomination of a BRP to assist with a ‘pre–assessment’, which is 
an investigation into whether the company is in fact in financial distress and has a reasonable 
prospect of success as per the 2008 Act.73 
 In terms of s 129 (7) of the 2008 Act, there is a statutory obligation on the board to 
send a notification to all stakeholders once they have established that they are financially 
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distressed. If they do not pursue the resolution after they have reasonable grounds to do so, 
they must provide notification to the affected persons on their reasons.74 This provides the 
stakeholders with an opportunity to make a court application. In the absence of a moratorium, s 
129 (7) is seen as unfavorable (in practice) as it could lead to creditors demanding payments, 
suppliers cancelling business, labour actions instituted by employees, together with trade 
unions, and this is likely to end up in a possible and immediate liquidation.75  
 The legal consequence of a moratorium76 and post–commencement finance77 are 
discussed in chapter 4. On the contrary, if they do not abide by the provision, they are 
accountable for the losses sustained.78 For example, where a shareholder continues to do 
business with the financially distressed company (unaware of its status) and is left with no 
security as a result.79 Consequently, the board may be regarded as ‘reckless’ and charged with 
gross negligence.80  
 However, a company would be protected under a civil claim in terms of s 22(1) and s 
218(2) if they were meticulous in understanding whether or not the company is financially 
distressed, and on this understanding, optioned not to send the notification in good faith.81 
Hence, clarity on the requirement is necessary to avoid further complications.  
(ii) There must be a reasonable prospect of rescue  
Similarly, the above requirement and ‘a reasonable prospect of rescue’ are essential recovery–
requirements of the business rescue regime for both commencement by court order82 and a 
board resolution.83 In the 2008 Act the term ‘reasonable prospect’ is not defined, and this is 
unfortunate considering the uncertainty experienced with the concept of a ‘reasonable 
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probability’ under the 1926 and 1973 Acts.84 It was, therefore, the task of the courts to 
subsequently interpret the meaning of ‘reasonable prospect.’ 
The Swart v Beagles Run Investments85 case was decided by Makgoba J and is 
reportedly the first case to apply the principles since the promulgation of the 2008 Act. The 
application was presented by an affected party (Mr Swart, the sole director and its only 
shareholder).86 The court determined the financial distress of the company, concluding it was 
severely insolvent and that the argument of factual insolvency could not be sustained based on 
the financial statements presented.87  
The court also accepted that the exotic animal values were exaggerated, and that the 
application lacked good faith.88 On determining whether there was a ‘reasonable prospect’, the 
judge sought guidance from the 1973 Act, considering the company must continue to be a 
‘successful concern’.89 Makgoba J defines this concept as continuing business usually and 
realising a better return for the creditors. Makgoba J was not convinced that the company 
demonstrated a reasonable prospect, and by the discretion of the court90 rejected the 
application, considering the financial burden that the applicant continuously caused the 
company to incur.91 Makgoba J concluded that the interests of the creditors should prevail after 
balancing both interests.92 
In Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 (Pty) 
Ltd,93 the application was brought by a creditor who argued that the respondent company 
would be able to continue successfully trading if it obtained the necessary funding to complete 
construction of the luxury hotel.94 Eloff J dealt with the ‘reasonable prospect’ requirement by 
contrasting the interpretation to ‘reasonable probability’, correctly stating that the threshold is 
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lower, and how the approach on the 2008 Act is aimed on facilitating business rescue rather 
than liquidation. 95  
Eloff J further deliberated on the ‘vague and uninformative’ plan and stated that the 
reasons for the company’s downfall and possible recovery solutions must be advanced, and set 
out the following objectively ascertainable factors that they could prove to satisfy the 
requirement of the company being sustainable: 
(i) ‘The likely costs of rendering the company able to commence with its intended  
 business, or to   resume the conduct of its core business; 
(ii)  The likely availability of the necessary cash resource in order to enable the ailing 
company to meet its day–to–day expenditure, once its trading operations commence 
or are resumed. If the company will be reliant on loan capital or other facilities, one 
would expect to be given some concrete indication of the extent thereof and the basis 
or terms upon which it will be available; 
(iii)   The availability of any other necessary resource, such as raw materials and human 
capital; and 
(iv)  The reasons why it is suggested that the proposed business plan will have a  
 reasonable prospect of success.’96 
The court could also not ascertain from the lack of concrete evidence whether a better 
return for creditors would emerge and that speculation thereof was insufficient.97 In Koen v 
Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd,98 the purchasers of an erf in Gqeberha 
brought this application. The respondent company was developing a golf estate on that land. 
However, it could not continue due to lack of investment and did not provide particulars 
relating to potential investors that would provide the necessary funding. Binns-Ward J stated 
that, providing clarity on the objective of either continuing to operate on a solvent basis or 
achieving a better return for creditors in the interim would be required, as this may also assist 
in the task of the BRP ascertaining the prospects of success and whether the court should 
appoint one for an investigation. This must be apparent in its founding documents.99 Binns-
Ward J concurred with the observations and guidelines advanced by Eloff J in Southern 
Place.100  
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In A G Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd101 the 
distressed company was commercially insolvent, their liabilities amounted to R 225 million, 
exceeding their assets valued at R 60 million. Consequently, liquidation proceedings and a 
failed compromise of debts had preceded this business rescue application. Coetzee J stated 
that, the reasonable prospect requirement must be satisfied regardless of whether ss 
131(4)(a)(i–iii) are relevant.102  
‘An interpretation that the second requirement only needs to be present if sub–section (iii) is 
relied upon would be illogical: On such an interpretation a financially distressed company and a 
company which failed to pay its debts could be placed under rescue irrespective of the 
prospects of their recovery. Yet, a company which requires rescue for other just and equitable 
reasons of a financial nature can only be placed under rescue if there is a reasonable prospect of 
its recovery.’103 
Traverso DJP passed judgment on the consolidated matters of Gormley v West City 
Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd104 and Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct 
Properties (Pty) Ltd.105 In this case the respondent, West City, was indebted for R 219 million 
to the bank. The court found that West City was not in financial distress as per the provisions, 
hence, the Chapter 6 provisions could not apply. Additionally, the company was already 
insolvent and would need a breathing space of approximately 3–5 years to pay off the debts.  
Traverso DJP stated in this regard that, ‘a measure of certainty is needed in the 
commercial world. Creditors cannot be left in a state of flux for an indefinite period.’106 
Moreover, the court found there was no reasonable prospect. Gormley’s argument on 
suspending the R 219 million loan for 3–5 years and sale of the sectional title units in the 
ordinary course, as opposed to a forced sale providing a better return for creditors was 
inadequate.107 
In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd, Essa and Another v Bestvest and Another,108 
Gamble J agreed with the interpretation by Eloff J in Southern Place109 and was concerned on 
the sufficiency of evidence for a reasonable prospect. Gamble J accordingly states the reasons 
of commercial insolvency: the reasonable expense of completing the building; the possibilities 
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of gathering funds to complete it; and how it plans to attain commercial viability thereafter is 
the preferred standard.110 
Employees of Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd v AFGRI Operations Ltd; In Re: 
AFGRI Operations Ltd v Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd,111 was the first case brought in 
terms of s 131(4) by employees. Kollapen J considered the factors by Eloff AJ in Southern 
Palace112 and agreed the rule of each case is dealt with on its own merit. Kollapen J remarked 
that whilst a reasonable prospect must be proved, consideration must be made for affected 
parties in the court application in respect to their knowledge of the company.113  
The court contrasted the availability of information between a shareholder and an 
employee concerning financial performance and status of the company. If the test for satisfying 
the requirement of reasonable prospect is more demanding for an affected party, the court must 
take this into account.114 Kollapen J also mentioned that the condition of an affected party 
producing a BR plan on the proceedings to satisfy the requirement of reasonable prospect is 
not envisaged in the Act. A BRP conducts that responsibility.115 Additionally, Kollapen J also 
distinguished the term ‘prospect’ as relating to something that is certain. Naturally, a prospect 
is future–looking and reliant upon several variables, and there is a risk attached, making the 
future incapable of a precise prediction.116 
   Van der Merwe J in Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 
Ltd117 agreed that speculations and uncertain averments were insufficient, and a factual 
foundation is necessary. However, Van der Merwe J remarked that Eloff AJ placed ‘the bar too 
high’ in Southern Palace.118 For context, Van der Merwe J noted ‘prospect’ as: 
‘An expectation may come true or it may not. It therefore signifies a possibility. A possibility 
is reasonable if it rests on a ground that is objectively reasonable. In my judgment a 
reasonable prospect means no more than a possibility that rests on an objectively reasonable 
ground or grounds.’119 
Furthermore, Van der Merwe J refers to the primary philosophy of Chapter 6 of the 
2008 Act, which seeks to avoid the adverse social and economic effects that were 
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experienced in the 1973 Act.120 Van der Merwe J states that the guidelines by Eloff AJ are 
equivalent to obliging proof of a probability and this unreasonably limits the chances of 
business rescue proceedings.121 
In Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd,122 Midnight Storm was the owner of an erf where a luxury hotel was 
commencing construction but ceased due to lack of funds and the applicant, Bonatla (a 
creditor), believed the development could result in a better outcome for shareholders than 
liquidation.123  
The respondent company was factually– and commercially insolvent and it could not 
pay its creditors because the hotel was incomplete as to generate income. Their only asset 
was valued at R 120 million against a debt of more than R 344 million.124 The court quoted 
the Oxford English Dictionary meaning of ‘prospect’ as both the ‘the possibility or likelihood 
of some event in the future occurring. A possibility is a thing that may ensue, and likelihood 
is the fact of something being likely, probable.’125 Stelzner AJ held that, the question must be: 
‘Whether the applicant, on the common facts of the case and where there is a real dispute of 
facts, on the respondent’s version, has shown that there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing 
the company in the sense that acceptance and implementation of the plan, upon which the 
applicant relies, has a possibility, based on objective facts, that it would result in a better 
outcome for creditors than liquidating the company.’126  
Accordingly, the application was dismissed. In Oakdene Square Properties127 the 
appellants in this matter sought to overturn the court a quo’s decision to liquidate the first 
respondent (Bothasfontein farm).128 The affected parties included: Oakdene Square Properties 
(creditors); Educated Risk Investments (shareholders); and the Theodosiou brothers.  
The brothers are the trustees of the MJF Trust which they asserted, previously owned 
the forty per cent shares in the company now held by Educated Risk Investments.129 The 
respondents included: Bothasfontein farm; Nedbank; and Imperial Holdings. Nedbank and 
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Imperial each had a thirty per cent of the shares in the company, and they were each owed R 
7.5 million by the company in the form of a shareholder’s loan.130 
The appellants’ core argument was that forcing a sale in execution would not be 
beneficial for the creditors and shareholders as the asset realisation value would be 
approximately R 120 million. In the ordinary course, the true market value on sale, according 
to experts, could realise between R 300 million to R 350 million.131 The respondents rejected 
this valuation and relied on their expert advice that the immovable assets worth were at least 
R 129 million and the liabilities of the company adding up to R 75 million, appearing to be 
factually insolvent.132 Accordingly, the appellants advanced their application based on 
business rescue yielding a better return than liquidation. They relied on the following 
grounds:  
(a) The immovable property could realise a better value by a business rescue  
  practitioner as opposed to a liquidator;  
 (b)  A business rescue practitioner’s fees are lower than a liquidator; and 
          (c)  Nebdbank’s secured claim could be discharged by the sale of the two Kyalami 
  erven (which are part of Bothasfontein farm), allowing the practitioner to trade 
  with the other hectares of the farm.133 
Consequently, it was unable to pay the judgment debt in favour of Nedbank which 
meant, it was also commercially insolvent for liquidation and financially distressed in terms 
of s 131(4)(a)(i).134 With regard to the objectives of the business rescue plan in terms of s 
128(1)(b)(iii), the primary goal would be to ensure that the company will continue on a 
solvent basis and a secondary (an alternative) goal is to facilitate a better return for creditors 
and stakeholders than immediate liquidation.  
The issue on hand was whether the requirement of ‘rescuing the company’ as 
contemplated in s 131(4)(a) is satisfied, it is clear from the beginning that the company can 
never be saved from immediate liquidation and that the only option is liquidating the 
company for a better return.135 Consequently, Brand AJ endorsed that s 128(1)(b) defines 
‘rescue’ and ‘rehabilitation’ to mean the success of one of the two objectives: (a) to return the 
company to solvency; or (b) to offer a better outcome for creditors and shareholders than 
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what they would receive over liquidation. The business rescue plan in terms of s 131(4) 
would be qualified where one of the two objectives is achieved.136 
The requirement of whether there was a reasonable prospect of rescue was addressed 
by Claassen J in the court a quo, and he agreed with Eloff AJ on the point that it required 
something less than the recovery requirement of its predecessor. Additionally, Claassen J 
stated that a court might exercise discretion to grant the order if the facts indicate a 
‘reasonable possibility of the company being rescued.’137 In essence, Brand AJ believes it 
requires more than a mere prima facie case or an arguable possibility. He further states that  
It must be a reasonable prospect which means that it must be a prospect based on reasonable 
grounds. A mere speculative suggestion is not enough. Moreover, because it is the applicant 
who seeks to satisfy the court of the prospect, it must establish these reasonable grounds in 
accordance with the rules of motion proceedings which, generally speaking, require that it 
must do so in its founding papers […] it will be neither practical nor prudent to be 
prescriptive about the way in which the appellant must show a reasonable prospect in every 
case.138 
Brand AJ concluded that the appellants’ argument of a BRP realising a better value 
for their assets and the liquidator’s fees exceeding the BRP to be mere speculation, as the fees 
of the liquidator are calculated as a percentage of the assets of the company. In contrast, 
BRP’s fees are based on a daily rate.139 The court addressed the problem with the valuation of 
the erven and found that even upon sale, the debt owed to Nedbank would not be discharged 
because of the interest accumulating and besides, there would be no income to pay 
outstanding debts, including the BRP’s remuneration.140  
With regard to the appellants’ argument on the sale of the immovable property after 
payment to creditors resulting in a cash surplus,141 Brand AJ was not convinced that this 
would establish a ‘business rescue’ within the meaning of s 128(1)(b)(iii). He remarked that a 
company which existed merely on the bank for cash had lost its credibility. Furthermore, the 
requirement could only be satisfied where there was a real possibility that the bank’s money 
would revive the company’s business and based on the irreconcilable differences between the 
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shareholders, that possibility can be excluded in this case. Brand AJ concluded that the 
liquidation of the company was the preferred route.142 
In Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd v Allan David Pellow,143 there was an appeal against Van 
Eeden AJ’s judgment in the high court for the final liquidation of Crystal Lagoon Investments 
53 (Pty) Ltd. The appellant was a single shareholder of the company144 and based its 
application on the foundation that Crystal Lagoon was financially distressed, and that it was 
just and equitable to place the company under business rescue; and that there was a 
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company by placing it under the supervision of business 
rescue. 
The court a quo accepted Crystal Lagoon being in financial distress but regarded the 
attachment of a BR plan in its founding papers to prove reasonable prospect as unnecessary. 
The mere advancement of facts that would materialise the likelihood of continuation on a 
solvent basis and a better return for creditors instead of liquidation would have sufficed in the 
court exercising discretion for granting the relief. The court held that the company could be 
sold as a ‘going concern’ and to balance the parties’ rights and interests, it granted a final 
winding–up order.145 
The main issue on appeal was therefore whether Newcity had shown a reasonable 
prospect of rescuing Crystal Lagoon.146 Maya AJ held that as per the explicit wording of 
these provisions, a court may not grant an application for business rescue unless there is a 
reasonable prospect for rescuing the company. In answering the question, a court uses its 
discretion in a broad sense, it makes a value judgment, and where a higher court disagrees 
with such decision, it is bound to intervene.147 Maya AJ accepted the meaning on ‘reasonable 
prospect’ as put forward in Oakdene Square Properties148 and Propspec Investments149 and 
subsequently dismissed the appeal.150 
In a recent high court case, Ziegler South Africa (Pty) Ltd v South African Express 
Airways SOC Ltd,151 the creditor contended that despite the reliance of the state–owned 
company on taxes and government–guaranteed debt, there is a chance of profitable trading if 
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the company is managed correctly.152 It argued its significant assets and provisioned flights to 
major cities and neighbouring countries.153 The court held that, the applicant had met the 
threshold of illustrating a reasonable prospect as required by s 131(4).154 Subsequently, three 
months after this judgment, the appointed BRPs applied for the airline’s provisional 
liquidation, stating that the airline had no reasonable prospects of being rescued after the state 
did not extend any post–commencement funding to the process.155 
With regard to whether a reasonable prospect is a minimum threshold that would 
apply to all applications, either board resolutions or court applications, the punctuation in the 
Act suggests that perhaps the requirement would apply to s 129(1) as a minimum requirement 
that needs to be met before business rescue can commence and that a court application in 
terms of s 131(4) would need to satisfy the minimum of being in financial distress.156 The 
alternative in this instance for ‘reasonable prospect’ would be whether the application is 
‘otherwise just and equitable for financial reasons.’157 
The word ‘prospect’ seems to rehash the uncertainty experienced under judicial 
management as the word is synonymous to meaning a ‘possibility’ or a ‘probability’. 
Therefore, this problem could have been avoided if the term ‘possibility’ was used instead.158 
Section 128 of the 2008 Act does not define ‘reasonable prospect of rescuing the company’ 
as well as the term ‘rehabilitation’, and this is inadequate considering the old Acts, where 
these concepts were problematic.159 
Before a board may adopt a voluntary application, they must have reasonable grounds 
to believe the company is financially distressed,160 and there appears to be a reasonable 
prospect of rescuing the company.161 The meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’ is also not defined 
in the Act. However, it seems to show that directors must believe that the requirements are in 
existence and they must have good reasons for this belief when voting for a resolution to 
commence business rescue proceedings and is thus an objective test.  
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 of the 2008 Act. 
157  Ibid. See also s 131(4)(a)(iii) of the 2008 Act. 
158  Loubser op cit note 69 at 59. 
159  Joubert op cit note 84 at 553. 
160  Section 129(1)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
161  Section 129(1)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
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The phrase refers to the company’s individual conditions at the time of the resolution, 
which will be known to the board, and is thus a subjective test. Loubser submits that the test 
should embrace a subjective and objective approach for consistency and to conform to the 
general standards set out for the conduct of directors in the 2008 Act.162 
According to Braatvedt, upon determining reasonable prospect, an objective or 
subjective test must not be applied rigidly and the feasible approach would be a subjective 
test on the firm and proven objective business facts.163 It is commonly followed that the 
assessment of this requirement must be viewed through the lens of a ‘reasonable 
businessman’.164 The query would then be ‘whether a reasonable, experienced businessman 
in that particular field would conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of success given the 
objective proved and not disputed facts.’165 
Depending on the type of application, it is submitted that the reasonable prospect 
requirement would be interpreted accordingly, founded on the information readily available 
to the parties bringing an application.166 The imbalance is that directors have more knowledge 
of the financial status of their company, and affected parties (employees and shareholders) do 
not.167 
As a result, Southern Palace Investments168 demonstrates the incorrect procedure 
where an application required a detailed BR plan to satisfy that there is a reasonable prospect, 
following a ‘checklist’ provided by Eloff AJ. Essentially, such a plan is only available after a 
BRP is appointed to devise a workable business plan after it has been voted on.169 
In the consequent judgments, Eloff AJ’s ‘checklist’ was regarded ‘as placing the bar 
too high’.170 Delport argues that such requirements place an illogical high benchmark.171 
 
162  Loubser op cit note 69 at 56. 
163  K Braatvedt ‘Is the test for reasonable prospect objective or subjective?’ available at https://www.tma-
 sa.com/info-centre/item/223-is-the-test-for-reasonable-prospect-objective-or-subjective.html, accessed 
 on 10 June 2020.  
164  Ibid. 
165  Ibid. 
166  Joubert op cit note 84 at 545. See also P Delport, P M Meskin (ed) & Q Vorster et al Henochsberg on 
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2016) 451–452; and 463–464, for a discussion of the dual gateway and the 
 burden of proof of the recovery requirement and some uncertainty that might exist depending on the 
 various stages of the application and the burden of proof. 
167  Joubert op cit note 84 at 545. See also Delport et al op cit note 168 at 464; Solar Spectrum supra note 
 113 para 18. 
168  Southern Palace Investments supra note 95. 
169  Joubert op cit note 84 at 577; see s 146(d) of the 2008 Act. 
170  Propspec Investments supra note 119 para 11; Newcity Group, China Construction Bank Corporation 
 Johannesburg Branch v Crystal Lagoon Investments 53 (Pty) Ltd (2013) ZAGPJHC 54 (‘Newcity HC’) 
 para 14. 
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Accordingly, it may be better for a BRP to deal with such questions instead of placing the 
expectation on the applicant to prove the requirements at the time the application is heard in 
court, which he regards would be ‘to place the horse before the cart’.172 Furthermore, such an 
expectation could signal the ‘death knell’ of business rescue in South Africa, making it 
ineffective like judicial management. 173 
It is submitted that Oakdene Square Properties,174 the landmark case which indicated 
that reasonable prospect must be proved on reasonable grounds, is not helpful. There are 
suggestions that inquires must be made on whether: a business exists; its business 
contributions; and its business model. It is agreed that for a company to have a reasonable 
prospect of success, it must make commercial sense.175 
Joubert and Delport submit that in Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd,176 Van der 
Merwe’s ‘reasonableness approach’ to a ‘reasonable prospect’ is the most realistic test that 
could be the solution to issues experienced in its interpretation.177 Essentially, this 
requirement is to safeguard that companies which are not economically sustainable, are 
liquidated rather than placed under business rescue.178 
Accordingly, although the cases discussed above interpreted the ‘reasonable prospect’ 
of rescuing the company in the context of s 131(4) of the 2008 Act and not in terms of s 
129(1), the meaning would apply to both provisions.179 
(iii) Rescuing the company to continue a solvent basis; or a better return for creditors or 
shareholders compared to a liquidation 
Section 128(1)(h) of the 2008 Act defines ‘rescuing the company’ as achieving the goals set 
out in the definition of business rescue in terms of s 128(1)(b)(iii) of the 2008 Act.180 Thus, s 
 
171  Y Mti Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd: A case 
 discussion of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision with reference to the reasonable prospect 
 requirement set out in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (unpublished LLM, University of Johannesburg, 
 2015) para 5.1. See also Delport et al op cit note 168 at 451. 
172  Mti op cit note 173 at para 5.1. See also Delport et al op cit note 168 at 468. 
173  Ibid.  
174  Oakdene Square SCA supra note 64  
175  Braatvedt op cit note 163. 
176  Propspec Investments supra note 119. 
177  Delport et al op cit note 168 at 468. See also Joubert op cit note 84 at 563. 
178  Cassim et al op cit note 42 at 865. 
179  Delport et al op cit note 168 at 460. 
180  According to s 128(1)(b) ‘business rescue’ is defined as ‘proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a 
 company that is financially distressed by providing for – (i) the temporary supervision of the company 
 and of the management of its affairs, business and property; (ii) a temporary moratorium on the 
 rights of claimants against the company or in respect of property in its possession; and (iii) the 
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128(1)(h) of the 2008 Act must be read together with s 128(1)(b)(iii) of the 2008 Act.181 In 
the event whereby there is no clear prospect of the company continuing to operate on a 
solvent basis, or being restored to solvency, our courts have not been able to reach a 
consensus on whether business rescue proceedings may be used to secure a better return for 
creditors or shareholder.182 
Joubert contends that the phrase ‘reasonable prospect for rescuing the company to 
become a successful concern’ must be read as a complete unit. Thus, this interpretation, in its 
entirety, needs more clarity. The primary objective is that the company will continue its 
business on the basis that it can be restored to a sound financial position after the plan is 
implemented.183 The secondary (or alternative) is that once implemented, the creditors stand 
to receive a better dividend than they would receive if the company is liquidated. The primary 
and secondary goals are both viewed as a successful business rescue. 184 
In Southern Palace Investments,185 the court held that adequate information must be 
presented to prove the objective for a better return for creditors and the terms it is based on 
and that a lack thereof is mere speculation that immediate liquidation was not a better option 
than business rescue.186 
Likewise, in terms of s 128(b)(iii), the company’s continued existence on a solvent 
basis is not the sole objective of business rescue as an alternative objective of stakeholders 
receiving a better return compared to what they would have received if the company was 
liquidated, is equally a successful concern.187 The latter is a substitute for the successful 
rescue of an ailing company, as confirmed in the SCA case of Oakdene Square Properties.188 
(iv) Non–payment of amounts due in respect of contractual or statutory obligations  
If an applicant (under a compulsory application) is unable to establish financial distress, they 
may then base an application for a business rescue order on the non–payment by the company 
 
 development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its 
 affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and equity in a manner that maximises the 
 likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, if it is not possible for the 
 company to so continue in existence, results in a better return for the company’s creditors or 
 shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the company.’ 
181  Oakdene Square SCA supra note 64 para 22. 
182  Ibid.  
183  Joubert op cit note 84 at 544. 
184  Ibid. 
185  Southern Palace Investments supra note 95. 
186  Ibid para 25. 
187  A G Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) para 12. 
188  Oakdene Square SCA supra note 64 paras 23–26. 
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of amounts due in respect of contractual or statutory obligations relating to employment 
matters, whereby even a single missed payment may suffice.189 Accordingly, Cassim submits 
that a failure to pay income tax deducted from employees or contributions to the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (‘UIF’), or to make payments to a medical aid, falls within 
the scope and ambit of s 131(4)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act.190 
Moreover, Loubser believes that, non–payment should occur over a specified 
minimum period or frequency before it constitutes a ground for rescue proceedings, and at 
least two consecutive payments should be missed.191 It is further noted that this subsection is 
not practical for modern companies who depend on programs, systems and banks to make 
necessary payments. 
(v) Just and equitable for financial reasons  
The second alternative available for a compulsory application is whether the court regards it 
as otherwise just and equitable ‘for financial reasons’.192 Loubser further argues that, 
interpretational difficulties will persist based on its vagueness and that this pre–condition be 
removed. Essentially, by including the circumstances of what a financially distressed 
company looks like, it may assist in interpreting the phrase ‘financially distressed’. This 
clarification will also assist applicants (under a compulsory application) who do not have 
easy access to the financial information that is required, in order to satisfy the court on this 
requirement when applying for an order to commence the procedure.193 
In conclusion, when dealing with a distressed company, the following factors may 
assist the courts in their determination: (1) the business and continuing sources of income; (2) 
the value of the brand and perception in the marketplace;194 (3) the total dedication of the 
current management and their communication with affected parties;195 (4) the accessibility of 
post–commencement finance;196 (5) how new technology results in new markets and products 
available to company;197 and (6) the benefit of cancelling or suspending obligations (a 
 
189  Section 131(4)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act. 
190  Cassim et al op cit note 42 at 874. 
191  Loubser op cit note 70 at 506. 
192  Section 131(4)(a)(iii) of the 2008 Act.  
193  Loubser op cit note 70 at 506. 
194  Braatvedt op cit note 163. 
195  Ibid. 
196  Ibid. 
197  Ibid. 
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moratorium and the socio–economic factors, including government spending and the 
demands of the industry it operates).198 
 
198  Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 3  
I DISCUSSION OF VOLUNTARY BUSINESS RESCUE WITH SPECIFIC 
REFERENCE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS (SOC) LIMITED 
CASE 
(a) Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to establish if SAA has met the necessary requirements listed 
in terms of ss 129(1)(a) and (b), in order to qualify for business rescue. In addition, an 
overview of the legal consequences of a moratorium and post–commencement finance is also 
explored. Historically, we have not witnessed any SOE that has experienced the business 
rescue process until SAA was placed under voluntary business rescue during early December 
of 2019. Hence, there is uncertainty surrounding the prospects for SOEs under this procedure.  
Since 2009, the proverbial warning lights have been flashing for SAA. To date, it has 
attempted to discharge its debts owed as a result of feeble investments and mismanagement.1 
Conventionally, it has been reliant on the taxpayer for money (from the National Treasury) 
for bailouts, as with most SOEs, which has safeguarded the airline from being immediately 
liquidated by creditors.2 If SAA enters liquidation proceedings, this may trigger the 
immediate settlement of loans worth billions, which the government is unable to sustain.3 
On 5 December 2019, a business rescue application was made in terms of s 129(1) of 
the 2008 Act.4 This voluntary application observes the first state–owned company to be 
placed under the procedure.5 Consequently, Mr Leslie Matuson and Mr Siviwe Dongwana 
were appointed as joint BRPs.6 
 
1  K Braatvedt ‘Is the test for reasonable prospect objective or subjective?’ available at 
 https://www.tma-sa.com/info-centre/item/223-is-the-test-for-reasonable-prospect-objective-or-
 subjective.html, accessed on 10 June 2020.  
2  H Wasserman ‘Explainer: How SAA landed in such a mess’ Business Insider SA 24 January 2020 
 available at https://www.businessinsider.co.za/what-happened-at-saa-2020-1, accessed on 20 
 September 2020. 
3  Ibid. 
4  ‘Business Rescue of South African Airways (SOC) Limited’ available at https://matusonassociates.
  co.za/saa/, accessed on 17 September 2020. 
5  M F Cassim ‘South African Airways makes an emergency landing into business rescue: Some burning 
 issues’ (2020) 137(2) SALJ 201. 
6  In terms of s 129(3)(b) of the 2008 Act; see also ‘Business Rescue of South African Airways (SOC) 
 Limited’ available at https://matusonassociates.co.za/saa/, accessed on 17 September 2020. 
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SOEs are governed by various legal frameworks, from the Companies Act, Public 
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (‘PFMA’), and regulations that apply specifically to the 
type of the enterprise. SAA is an example of a national SOE, defined as:  
‘A national government business enterprise; or a board, commission, company, corporation, 
fund or other entity (other than a national government business enterprise) which is 
established in terms of national legislation; fully or substantially funded either from the 
National Revenue Fund, or by way of a tax, levy or other money imposed in terms of national 
legislation; and accountable to Parliament.’7 
The airline was established on 1 February 1934.8 Thereafter, Union Airways (‘UA’) 
was acquired by the government, making it the first SOE airline in South Africa.9 The airline 
is entirely owned by the government, and it is under the supervision of the Department of 
Public Enterprises (‘DPE’) as the entrusted shareholder.10 The business conducted by SAA 
comprises of transporting passengers, as well as cargo, to local, regional, and international 
routes, functioning as a national carrier.11  
Related services are also offered by Mango, SAA Technical (‘SAAT’), Airchefs, and 
the South African Travel Centre (‘SATC’), which are exclusively owned subsidiaries of 
SAA.12 Furthermore, SA Airlink and SA Express are the feeder airlines to SAA and SAA 
licenses its airline code to these airlines.13 However, during business rescue, the license 
arrangement between SAA and SA Airlink was terminated on 26 March 2020.14 On 28 April 
2020, SA Express was accorded provisional liquidation.15 
Since its establishment, SAA began providing airline services to thirty destinations.16 
The entity owned a fleet of forty-nine aircraft,17 and has since, employed 4 708 employees.18 
SAA Voyager, SAA Lounges, and SAA Cargo are divisions of the company.19 
 
7  M H Kanyane, G Houston, G Onuoha et al (2011) Legislative and regulatory framework review, the 
 role of SOEs in skills development and job creation, SOEs contribution to enterprise and socio–
 economic development and the qualitative review of the SOEs landscape in South Africa 
 (Commissioned by the Presidential SOE Review Committee, December) 203. 
8  Ibid at 204. 
9  Op cit note 4 para 12.1.1.  
10  Ibid para 12.1.8.    
11  Ibid para 12.1 .2.  
12  Kanyane et al op cit note 7 at 205. 
13  Op cit note 4 para 12.1.6.  
14  Ibid para 12.1.6.1.  
15  Ibid para 12.1.6.2.  
16  Ibid para 12.1.3.1.  
17  Ibid para 12.1.3.2. 
18  Ibid para 12.1.7. 
19  Ibid para 12.1.4. 
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(b) Financial distress  
In assessing whether a company is financially distressed, a company must either be 
commercially insolvent, by which the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or 
is presumably factually insolvent, in that the company’s liabilities exceed its assets at any 
time. In both instances, the time–frame is within the next six months.20 Likewise, SAA was 
financially distressed in both cases of this definition at the time the business rescue process 
was initiated.21 
To date, the SOE boards have banked on state–guaranteed funding from the National 
Treasury and have had the option of guarantees to reduce their risk of being financially 
distressed in terms of s 128(1) of the 2008 Act. An important question discussed here is 
‘whether business rescue is available to companies that are already insolvent?’. This was after 
SAA entered into business rescue but were factually insolvent, with its liabilities exceeding 
its assets by almost R 13 billion.22 
In assessing whether a SOE is in financial distress, this can be evaluated by ‘whether 
or not the state guarantees can ensure that all the debts due by the company can be repaid, or 
whether certain creditors will remain unpaid.’23 The inability to discharge present debts as 
they fall due and payable is a liquidity issue and the crux of financial distress.24 As 
mentioned, this is regarded as commercial insolvency or the ‘cash–flow’ test. 
It is agreed that the test should be determined on the financial standing of the 
company, holistically concerning the commercial practicality.25 Furthermore, aside from the 
financial resources readily available, funding that can be sourced from the sale of assets, 
loans, or support from a holding or subsidiary company, must be assessed in tandem. 
Regarding SAA’s situation, attention must be paid to the capital obtained from the 
government (as a shareholder).26 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a company is financially distressed if, by analysis, it is 
commercially or factually insolvent. Accordingly, it is essential to also investigate the 
 
20  Section 128(1)(f)(i–ii) of the 2008 Act. 
21  Cassim op cit note 5 at 206. 
22  Ibid at 201; see also ‘South African Airways lost over $700 mln in past 2 years’ available at 
 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-12-02-south-african-airways-lost-over-700-mln-in-past-
 2-yearsdocuments/, accessed on 18 July 2020. 
23  E Levenstein ‘South Africa’s state–owned enterprises: prime candidates for business rescue?’ (2018) 
 Without Prejudice available at https://www.withoutprejudice.co.za/publication/2018/October/articles, 
 accessed on 15 July 2020. 
24  F H I Cassim (ed), M F Cassim, R Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 864. 
25  Cassim op cit note 5 at 206. 
26  Ibid.  
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following scenarios: (1) Would a company that is factually solvent but commercially 
insolvent be in financial distress? (2) Would a company that is factually insolvent, though 
commercially solvent, be in financial distress? 
In the first instance, it is most common that companies are illiquid as opposed to 
factually insolvent. For example, a business may have greater assets than liabilities but may 
struggle to pay debts when they become due because those assets are not easily realisable.27 
In terms of s 128(1)(f), the SCA ruled that a company being factually solvent but 
commercially insolvent is in financial distress.28 
In the second instance, the contrary has no precedent in the South African courts.29 
The question regarding SAA is whether or not SAA satisfies the test of financial distress on 
factual insolvency apart from the continuous financial backing from the state to remain 
commercially solvent? According to Cassim: 
‘A company that is commercially solvent has a greater prospect of satisfying the factual 
solvency test. But a commercially solvent company may be factually insolvent — for 
instance, it may have long- term debts which its assets are not reasonably capable of 
meeting.’30 
As per the business rescue plan drawn by the BRPs on 16 June 2020 (including the 
latest amendments), some of the reasons for SAA’s financial distress are attributed to the 
following events: For the past ten years, the airline has incurred major losses and 
retrospectively, 2011 was one reported year that it had made a profit. Since 2012, the 
company has amassed debt over R 27 billion in 2019. Due to the exchange rates (between the 
US $ and the R) doubling from 2011, fuel costs and the airlines leasing costs were altered. 
Subsequently, a secured long–term debt (in 2012) soared from R 2 billion to above R 13 
billion in 2019 (with interest). At the end of March 2017, the final audited yearly commercial 
statements for SAA indicated a ‘material uncertainty relating to going concern’ due to the 
airline already being insolvent with liabilities surpassing assets by R 18 billion. 
Consequently, the unaudited statements up until 31 March 2019 presented factual insolvency 
of R 12.9 billion.31 
 
27  Ibid. It could be locked–up capital or property in a real estate development. 
28  Ibid. See also Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd 2013 
 (4) SA 539 (SCA) (‘Oakdene Square SCA’) para 7; Al Mayya International Ltd (BVI) v Valley of the 
 Kings Thaba Motswere (Pty) Ltd (2017) JOL 38030 (EL). 
29  Ibid. See also Dale v Aeronastic Properties Ltd (2016) ZAWCHC 160. 
30  Cassim op cit note 5 at at 207. 
31  Op cit note 4 paras 12.3.1.1.1–12.3.1.1.7. 
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SAA suffered increased liquidity problems, and the continuous state–guaranteed 
funding (or bailouts) frequently relied on by the SOE would be discontinued, but the 
government confirmed making capital available to enable a radical restructure of SAA. In 
October of 2019, the airline was grounded by Civil Aviation Authorities for non–compliance, 
which tainted its reputation with travel agents and customers. In November 2019, an eighty–
day industrial action obstructed the cash–flow of the airline.32 
On 21 November 2019, Solidarity (a trade union) made a compulsory business rescue 
application after the industrial action. Consequently, several insurers had withdrawn their 
travel insurance, travel agents had ceased selling tickets with the airline and suggested 
alternate airlines to customers. Thereafter, the public lost confidence in the airline’s 
sustainability, consequently cancelling flights and demanding refunds.33 
With regard to management, over the last ten years, the governance issues at SAA has 
created a high turnover of executive management. There were eight chief executive officers 
(‘CEOs’) with five as acting CEOs. There were four chief financial officers (‘CFOs’) (with 
one being temporary) and around fifty persons assisting in the Exco for the last ten years and 
only eight serving for five years. Likewise, SAA had five board chairpersons throughout the 
same timeframe.34 Furthermore, the subsidiaries of the airline were dependent on SAA for 
working capital, and lastly, ticket rates were hampered due to accelerated competition.35 
In short, SAA experienced illiquidity for the reasons mentioned above. As a result of 
the substantial loss of income, they were financially distressed due to the inability to pay 
debts when they fell due.36 
(c) Reasonable prospect  
The purpose of business rescue is to ensure that the rescue is effective enough for a company 
to recover from the financial difficulty, in a sense that balances the rights and interests of 
relevant stakeholders.37 Essentially, business rescue proceedings are not for the ‘terminally–’ 
or ‘chronically ill’. They are for ailing companies which, at some point, may be salvaged and 
become solvent again.38 
 
32  Ibid paras 12.3.1.2–12.3.1.2.3. 
33  Ibid paras 12.3.1.2.5–12.3.1.2.5.3. 
34  Ibid paras 12.3.1.2.6–12.3.1.2.6.3. 
35  Ibid paras 12.3.1.2.7–12.3.1.2.8. 
36  Ibid para 12.3.2. 
37  Section 7(k) of the 2008 Act. 
38  Welman v Marcelle Props 193 CC (2012) ZAGPJHC 32 para 2. 
34 
Since SAA’s entrance into business rescue proceedings, its problems have increased 
due to the ongoing Covid–19 pandemic, which has piloted many global airlines into financial 
distress. Around March of 2020, the government enforced the suspension of all commercial 
flights in order to combat the virus during the lockdown period.39 However, prior the 
pandemic, for the last five years, the airline has suffered losses around R 23 billion, income 
declined by R 844 million from November of 2019 up until December of 2020.40 
As per the business rescue plan drawn by the BRPs on 16 June 2020 (including the 
latest amendments), the ‘proposed restructure’ entails, inter alia, the government’s 
confirmation to suspend further fiscal support and the advancement of the BR plan where it 
results in a more feasible national airline.41 The present corporate structure will not be altered 
by the proposed restructure.42 The proposed restructure can only be initiated if the following 
conditions in the BR plan are satisfied:  
On liquidation, as per the commencement date of the BR plan, and according to Price 
Waterhouse Coopers’ (‘PwCs’) calculation, it is likely that concurrent creditors would have 
received zero–cents in the Rand as a potential dividend.43 Accordingly, with business rescue, 
concurrent creditors are expected to receive an anticipated seven–and–a–half cents in the 
Rand, as dividend distributed proportionally. Around R 600 million has been allocated to be 
paid over three years.44 Lessors are to collect R 1.7 billion as dividend distribution to be paid 
over three years as well.45 Post–commencement finance (‘PCF’) creditors would be paid from 
the operational capital injection, and their claims are prioritised under the Companies Act.46 
Lenders will receive payment over three years.47 
Through the Leadership Compact Forum, or the s 189 procedure in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’), employees and SAA’s representatives will 
 
39  A Winning ‘South African Airways can still be saved with funding: administrators’ Reuters 27 May 
 2020 available at https://br.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-saa/south-african-airways-can-still-be-
 saved-with-funding-administrators-idUSKBN2330OB, accessed on 15 June 2020. 
40  In comparison to the same timeframe of the previous year. See C Smith ‘SAA rescue process in 
 apparent limbo, with no sign of funding’ 5 August 2020 News24 available at https://www.news24.com
 /fin24/companies/industrial/saa-rescue-process-in-apparent-limbo-with-no-sign-of-funding-20200805, 
 accessed on 25 August 2020. 
41  Op cit note 4 para 26.1. 
42  Ibid para 26.2. 
43  Ibid para 26.4.1.1; See also para 19.  
44  Ibid paras 26.4.1.2.1.1–26.4.1.2.1.2. 
45  Ibid paras 26.4.1.2.1.3–26.4.1.2.1.4. 
46  Ibid paras 26.4.1.2.2.1–26.4.1.2.2.2. 
47  Ibid para 26.4.1.2.3.1; see also ‘Business Rescue of South African Airways (SOC) Limited’ 13 July 
 2020 para 30.3, available at https://matusonassociates.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/proposed-
 amendments-to-the-south-african-airways1938058.8.pdf, accessed on 17 September 2020. 
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conclude an agreement should the proposed restructure be implemented, by which the 
company foresees around one–thousand employees being retained.48 Also, approximately 
one–thousand employees will be directed on an interim or ‘training lay–off’, scheme for 
twelve months, where the airline will make contributions capped monthly at  R 4 650, for 
employee’s UIF, pension, and medical aid. In addition, SAA will offer ‘voluntary severance 
packages’ to employees and the remaining employees under s 189 of the LRA procedure will 
be retrenched. The overall expense for the above is anticipated to be a maximum of R 2.2 
billion. Furthermore, new terms and conditions of employment will be deliberated, 
considering current market conditions. 49   
 A receivership was proposed in the BR plan to be in operation from the substantial 
implementation date. Its purpose would be to shift numerous obligations from affected 
parties, allowing the airline to continue with a restructured balance–sheet and commercial 
ventures devoid of the burden of the pre–commencement liabilities. Also, allowing payments 
to pre–commencement creditors, payments to lenders, and repayments to all creditors, after 
the notice of substantial implementation is filed.50 
Thereafter, the projected funding would be for the proposed restructure, from raising 
operational capital injection to resume operating, to paying retrenchment costs and assistance 
for the social plan. Also, to recompensing lenders amounts owed51 and the resolve of SAA as 
a ‘going concern’ by fulfilling client bookings or any consequent vouchers that they may 
receive per the airline’s policy.52 Overall, the funding is divided into immediate–, medium–, 
and long–term brackets, reinforcing the proposed restructure, as being conditional on the BR 
plan’s implementation.53 
Theoretically, the reasonable prospect requirement in terms of the 2008 Act is aimed 
on facilitating business rescue rather than liquidation.54 Moreover the reasons, as mentioned 
above, are points advanced in the BR plan for the likelihood of continuation on a solvent 
 
48  Ibid para 26.4.2.1. 
49 ‘Business Rescue of South African Airways (SOC) Limited’ 13 July 2020 para 13, available at 
 https://matusonassociates.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/proposed-amendments-to-the-
 south-african-airways1938058.8.pdf, accessed on 17 September 2020. 
50  Op cit note 4 paras 26.4.3.1–26.4.3.2.3. 
51  Ibid para 26.4.4.2.3. See also ‘Business Rescue of South African Airways (SOC) Limited’ 13 July 
 2020 para 30.3, available at https://matusonassociates.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/proposed-
 amendments-to-the-south-african-airways1938058.8.pdf, accessed on 17 September 2020.para 30.3. 
51  Ibid paras 26.4.3.1–26.4.3.2.3. 
52  Ibid paras 26.4.4.2.1–26.4.4.2.4. 
53  Ibid para 26.4.4.3. 
54  2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (‘Southern Palace Investments’) paras 21–22.  
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basis and a better return for creditors instead of liquidation.55 In addition, due to the intricacy 
of SAA, it is estimated that liquidation could proceed over twenty–four months without the 
prospect of paying dividends to general concurrent creditors, and in some instances, only 
paying other creditors years later.  
Should the BR plan be implemented, general concurrent creditors would receive a 
payment within one year of the substantial implementation date.56 Also, the fees for a 
liquidator as per PwC’s calculation is estimated to be around R 369 million, after realising 
SAA’s assets, which is significantly higher than the business rescue process.57 
 Naturally, a prospect is future–looking and reliant upon several variants, and there is 
a risk attached, making the future incapable of a precise prediction.58 The BRPs have set out 
the following factors that could adversely impinge on what has been proposed in the business 
rescue plan: (1) in terms of the proposed restructure, the fulfilment of these conditions exceed 
their timelines, or the restructure fails for any reason; (2) any unexpected litigation; (3) 
Unforeseen damages from contracts being cancelled; (4) any amendments in legislation that 
may affect business rescue; (5) any barriers, refusal or changes to the business rescue plan; 
(6) regulatory encounters; (7) events outside the BRPs control of any nature including the 
impact of coronavirus (Covid–19); (8) the material inconsistencies in the information 
presented to the BRPs by management;59 (9) the effect of market conditions deteriorating; 
and (10) PCF becoming insufficient.60 
According to Duvenhage, SAA has the options of liquidation, foreign direct 
investment (‘FDI’), and a recovery bundle in terms of s 16 of the PFMA. Liquidation would 
trigger immediate payment of ‘implicit guarantees’ to creditors, although the process could 
decrease future operational losses from continuing.61 The reboot of SAA could attract FDI by 
restarting as a smaller global franchisee in collaboration with a broader global commercial 
airline.62 Essentially, the government will have a minority stake, and this would require a 
 
55  In terms of s 150(2)(b)(vi) of the 2008 Act, the benefits to creditors of adopting the business rescue 
 plan must be compared against the liquidation.  
56  Op cit note 4 paras 39.3.1–39.3.2. 
57  Ibid para 36.3.5.2. 
58  (NGC) unreported case no 6418/2011, 18624/2011 and 66226/2011 of 16 May 2012 (‘Solar 
 Spectrum’) para 33. 
59  Op cit note 4 paras 40.1–40.1.8. 
60  Ibid paras 40.1.9–40.1.10. 
61  C Duvenhage ‘SAA, Fly me to the moon’ 01 September 2020 available at https://www.ufs. ac.za/
 templates/news-archive/campus-news/2020/september/saa-fly-me-to-the-moon?NewsItemID=941, 
 accessed on 15 September 2020. 
62  Ibid.  
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change in the law to permit better FDI into SAA.63 Lastly, a business rescue package for the 
airline can be sourced from the public’s pension funds. In terms of s 16 of the PFMA, the 
purpose of the Act is: 
To regulate financial management in the national government and provincial governments; to 
ensure that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of those governments are managed 
efficiently and effectively; to provide for the responsibilities of persons entrusted with 
financial management in those governments, and to provide for matters connected 
therewith.64 
During July of 2017, the national treasury issued a media statement from what source 
the government utilised the national revenue fund (‘NRF’) to discharge debts to Standard 
Chartered Bank, in order to circumvent a default.65 It reasoned, inter alia, that recapitalising 
SAA to advance financial standing was their plan, as mentioned in the February of 2017 
Budget, and that s 16 of the PFMA was used as ‘the last resort’ considering the problems 
experienced at the time.66 Accordingly, the minister of finance may approve using the NRF to 
pay expenses of an ‘exceptional’ nature which is presently not covered for and cannot 
(without serious bias to the interests of public) be delayed to a prospective parliamentary 
distribution of funds.67 
(d) Moratorium   
Once the restructuring of the distressed company has commenced, the creditors’ claims and 
shareholders’ rights or are suspended, in order to allow the company ‘breathing space’.68 A 
general moratorium (or automatic stay) is a necessary consequence on legal proceedings or 
executions against the company, its assets, property, and the exercise of the rights of the 
company’s creditors.69 This is covered under s 133(1) of the 2008 Act, subject to certain 
exceptions.70 
 
63  Ibid.  
64  See s 16 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (‘PFMA’). 
65  RSA Gov ‘Government transfers funds from National Revenue Fund to South African Airways’ 1 July 
 2020 available at https://www.gov.za/speeches/government-transfers-funds-national-revenue-fund-
 south-african-airways-1-jul-2017-0000, accessed on 20 September 2020. 
66  Ibid.  
67  See s 16(1) of the PFMA. 
68  E Levenstein An Appraisal of the New South African Business Rescue Procedure (published LLD 
 thesis, University of Pretoria, 2015) 153. 
69  Cassim op cit note 24 at 878. 
70  See s 133(1): ‘During business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement action, 
 against the company, or in relation to any property belonging to the company, or lawfully in its 
 possession, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum, except – (a) with the written consent 
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Most contemporary business countries have created a rescue regime that provides 
‘protection’ for the debtor company. The procedure is initiated by temporary bankruptcy and 
a belief that the company can continue as a sustainable entity. Business rescue is commonly 
endorsed to preserve jobs, enable the continuation of the business, ensure partial (or full) 
payment of its debts owed, and to safeguard investments.71 According to Smits, the 
moratorium is an essential requirement for effective restructuring of a company in financial 
distress.72 
During January of 2020, SA Airlink (one of SAA’s feeder airlines and subsequent 
creditor) made an application to the high court seeking relief against SAA in terms of s 
133(1)(b) of the 2008 Act. They further sought a declaratory order for their monetary claims 
against the airline not to be subjected to s 154(2) of the 2008 Act, as they are not ‘debts 
owed’ as per the provision.73  
Lastly, they demanded R 510 million to be paid by SAA whilst under business 
rescue.74 Accordingly, the court held that an order under s 133(1) of the Act must establish a 
prima facie case, coupled with reasons for the proceedings being ‘necessary and 
appropriate’.75 Kathree-Setiloane J dismissed the application as SA Airlink were unsuccessful 
in establishing a claim to ‘lift the moratorium on legal proceedings against SAA’.76 
In the South African Airways (SOC) Limited (In Business Rescue) v National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) case,77 the labour appeal court (‘LAC’) had to decide 
whether or not a BRP could commence with retrenchment proceedings under s 189 of the 
LRA, before the publication of a BR plan (as contemplated in s 150 of the 2008 Act). The 
court a quo, and this court, was tasked with balancing the rights of all stakeholders 
 
 of the practitioner; (b) with the leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the court considers 
 suitable; (c) as a set–off against any claim made by the company in any legal proceedings, irrespective 
 whether those proceedings commenced before or after the business rescue proceedings began; (d) 
 criminal proceedings against the company or any of its directors or officers; or (e) proceedings 
 concerning any property or right over which the company exercises the powers of a trustee.’ 
71  Levenstein op cit note 68 at 153; see also H Rajak & J Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ 
 (1999) 116 SALJ 262. 
72  Levenstein op cit note 68 at 154; see also A Smits ‘Corporate Administration: A Proposed Model’ 
 (1999) De Jure. 
73  See s 154(2) of the 2008 Act: ‘If a business rescue plan has been approved and implemented in 
 accordance with this Chapter, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company 
 immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process, except to the extent provided for in 
 the business rescue plan.’ 
74  SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd v South African Airways (SOC) Limited (In Business Rescue) reported case no 
 2020/01078 of 2 March 2020 available at https://www.saripa.co.za/downloads/20200302-SA-Airlink-v-
 SAA.pdf , accessed on 20 September 2020. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid paras 64–66. 
77  2020 (41) ILJ 2113 (LAC) (‘SAA NUMSA LAC’). 
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(employees included) in the BR plan, considering the interpretation of s 136 of the 2008 
Act.78  
The BRPs issued notices in terms of s 189 or s 189A of the LRA process, in an effort 
to rescue the airline. However, the respondents had demanded it be withdrawn or postponed 
until the BR plan is adopted.79 The court a quo upheld this view. It was argued that this 
judgment could be instrumental in future business rescue plans failing.80 Hence, on appeal, 
the main issue was interpreting s 136(1)(b) of the 2008 Act.81 The court found that the main 
objective of a business rescue is to provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of a 
financially distressed company whilst balancing the rights and interests of all relevant 
stakeholders (including employees) and consequently supported the labour court’s 
judgement.82 Secondly, although the court attempted to encourage job preservation, this 
judgment could influence employers under business rescue to consider retrenchments going 
forward. The initiation of a consultation process was previously prescribed when an employer 
anticipated retrenchment. Following to this judgement and throughout the business rescue 
proceedings, ‘the need to retrench must be rooted in the business rescue plan’.83 
With regard to the issue on ‘voluntary severance packages’, the court held that BRPs 
could make an offer unilaterally to avoid retrenchments before the rescue plan is adopted. 
Ultimately, both courts have set a precedent by creating a moratorium on retrenchments 
during the start of the rescue plan and prior to its publication.  
In short, the verdict states that the voluntary severance packages must be 
contemplated before the retrenchment process, in order to balance the dispute between 
advancing fair labour practices and the duty of BRPs to balance the rights of all affected 
parties. 84 
 
78  Ibid para 1. 
79  Ibid para 2.  
80  T Jordaan, A Bezuidenhout & J Osmond ‘A Balancing Act: The labour appeal court gives final verdict 
 on SAA (in business rescue) v NUMSA employee retrenchment appeal’ 10 July 2020 available at 
 https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/export/sites/cdh/en/news/publications/2020/dispute/Downloads/B
 usiness-Rescue-Restructuring-Insolvency-and-Employment-Alert-10-July-2020.pdf, accessed on 22 
 July 2020. See also W Badenhorst, S Horsfield & R Chasela ‘COVID–19 – NUMSA v SAA – The death 
 knell to successful business rescue?’ available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
 03c5c21b-096a-401e-9d83-5be2db71c2e3, accessed  on 22 July 2020. 
81  See s 136(1): ‘Despite any provision of an agreement to the contrary – (b) any retrenchment of any 
 such employees contemplated in the company’s business rescue plan is subject to [s] 189 and 189A of 
 the [LRA] 66 of 1995, and other applicable employment related legislation.’ 
82  SAA NUMSA LAC supra note 77 paras 11–12.  
83  Ibid para 11. 
84  Ibid paras 41–44. 
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(e) Post–commencement finance   
The nature and extent of PCF is outlined in s 135 of the 2008 Act and is fundamental to the 
business rescue proceedings, like the moratorium.85 The courts have drawn parallels between 
the ability to secure PCF and the requirement of a reasonable prospect being met.86 
Accordingly, by trial–and–error, BRPs have suggested that ‘no PCF means no reasonable 
prospect for rescue unless proven otherwise.’87 After business rescue commences, it is 
imperative to gather funding that will allow the company to continue as a ‘going concern’ 
and enable business activities such as: labour expenses; rent; insurance; maintenance of 
contracts; assets; and other operational costs.88 
Many business rescue failures are related to the inability to facilitate PCF. Naturally, 
in order to raise funds, the distressed company would look to existing creditors to either 
compromise or postpone their right to claim or to extend financial support to them. However, 
access to finance becomes inaccessible during economic stagnation (in hindsight, the 2008 
global financial crisis and the current Covid–19 pandemic).89  
Some reasons for the lack of financing may be due to institutions trying to avoid risks 
and only extending loan financing upon assets as surety (and the financially distressed are 
seldom in the positions to satisfy this condition). Private equity, sale, leaseback agreements, 
and business rescue funds are approached as a last resort to invest in the company.  
However, some drawbacks could be that they are either not well–developed in South 
Africa or are reluctant to invest in an ailing company.90 Additionally, the law in this space is 
underdeveloped. Judicial management did not deal with the present biases concerning 
insolvency law with regard to an ‘undue preference’ given to creditors’ claims.91 Although 
 
85  Cassim op cit note 24 at 882. 
86  J Calitz & G Freebody ‘Is post–commencement finance proving to be the thorn in the side of business 
 rescue proceedings under the 2008 Companies Act?’ (2016) De Jure 267. See also A G Petzetakis 
 International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) (‘A G Petzetakis’) para 
 29; Southern Palace Investments supra note 54; Oakdene Square SCA supra note 64 para 33; Newcity 
 Group (Pty) Ltd v Pellow, China Construction Bank Corporation Johannesburg Branch v Crystal 
 Lagoon Investments 53 (Pty) Ltd (2013) ZAGPJHC 54. 
87  M Pretorius ‘Business Rescue: Status Quo report: Final Report’ Business Enterprises – University of 
 Pretoria 2015 available at https://static.pmg.org.za/151110Business_Rescue.pdf 46, accessed on 16 
 September 2020. 
88  M Pretorius & W Rosslyn-Smith ‘Expectations of a business rescue plan: International directives for 
 Chapter 6 implementation’ (2014) Southern African Business Review 132. 
89  W Du Preez ‘Post–commencement finance: The silver bullet for business rescue?’ Business Rescue 
 Exchange available at https://www.brexchange.co.za/pcm-silver-bullet/, accessed on 22 September 
 2020.  
90  Ibid.   
91  Calitz & Freebody op cit note 86 at 286.  
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business rescue is regarded as more ‘debtor–friendly’ and represents a complete paradigm 
shift from its precursor, the benefits will take time to unfold.92 
Furthermore, investors may be unwilling to extend finance due to the nature of the 
ranking of creditors.93 The order of ranking PCF (as it is presently understood in the Act and 
in practice) is as follows: 
 (1) The practitioner’s remuneration and costs or disbursements are paid first in 
  terms of s 135(3), including all other costs from business rescue proceedings 
  as a top priority. 
(2)   All employees who have worked since the commencement of business rescue 
 (in terms of ss 134–135 of the 2008 Act) are considered ‘super–priority’ post–
 commencement financiers. (This provision is unique to South Africa) 
(3)   Secured lenders or creditors who had security in place before business rescue 
 or secured post–commencement financiers in the order it was granted. (It is 
 unclear about whether secured creditors will rank before PCF lenders) 
(4)   Insolvency creditors. 
(5)   Unsecured PCF lenders claim, in the order, they were incurred. 
(6)   All other unsecured creditors (includes employees’ salary before business 
 rescue).94 
Consequently, the preference in ranking would remain the same should a BR 
proceeding be converted into liquidation of the company, however, the claims in this instance 
would rank below the costs of liquidation.95 
At the time of this research, SAA needs around R 10.5 billion to resume operation.96 
Various sources for funding have been considered, and institutions and lenders have been 
approached for the financing. It is possible that the NRF could be utilised in order to attract a 
prospective equity partner, despite the government’s assurance not to invoke s 16.97 On 28 
October 2020, the ‘Medium–Term Budget Policy Statement 2020’ (‘MTBPS’) detailed the 
 
92  Ibid.  
93  Ibid at 271.  
94  Du Preez op cit note 89. 
95  Calitz & Freebody op cit note 86 at 271; s 135(4) of the 2008 Act. 
96  ‘Gordhan: SA government will provide initial funding for SAA’ Fin24 19 September 2020 available at 
 https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/industrial/sa-government-to-help-fund-national-airlines-
 rescue-20200919, accessed on 22 September 2020. 
97  Duvenhage op cit note 61. 
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allocation of R 10.5 billion to implement the restructuring of SAA. A further R 6.5 billion 
was extended to the airline, in order to discharge its guaranteed debt and interest.98 
(f) Conclusion  
In tandem with the above conditions, the BR plan would be fully operational once the rescue 
plan is approved and executed in terms of s 152 of the Companies Act. Transactions in terms 
of s 54(2) of the PFMA read with the ‘Significance and Materiality Framework for SAA’ are 
approved by the minister of public enterprises and the minister of finance (as executive 
authority for SAA). 99 
Transactions that are subject to approval in terms of the memorandum of 
incorporation (‘MoI’) must be assented to by the minister of public enterprises, in his 
capacity as a representative shareholder of SAA.100 Agreements between employees and trade 
unions regarding the workforce reduction and new terms and conditions under current market 
conditions must be reached within the stipulated period.101 Furthermore, a confirmation 
evidenced by letter, of the government’s assistance to provide funding for the rescue plan 
from the DPE and the Department of National Treasury at a specified date.102 On 12 August 
2020, the DPE confirmed that the conditions were met and were in the process of managing 
four stages to complete the rescue plan. They are as follow: 
‘The restructuring of the airline – including the implementation of Voluntary Severance 
Packages to employees; the appointment of non–executive directors and new management 
team; the selection and appointment of Transaction Advisors; and the formation of a 
customer–centric airline designed to be lean, technology capable, digitally modernised and 
agile to service all market segments.’103 
In summary, SAA was able to satisfy the court that they were financially distressed, 
hence the commencement of this BR plan and the requirement of a reasonable prospect which 
is reliant on the PCF being timeously available as pledged by its lenders. 
 
98  National Treasury RSA ‘Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2020’ 28 October 2020 para 39, 
 available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2020/mtbps/FullMTBPS.pdf, accessed on 14 
 November 2020. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Ibid paras 2020 paras 42.1–42.1.3 
101  Ibid para 42.1.4; See also ‘Business Rescue of South African Airways (SOC) Limited’ 13 July 2020 
 para 33, available at https://matusonassociates.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/proposed-
 amendments-to-the-south-african-airways1938058.8.pdf, accessed on 17 September 2020. 
102  Ibid para 42.1.5; see also: para 28. 
103  RSA Gov ‘Public Enterprise on implementing SAA Business Rescue Plan’ 12 August 2020 available at 
 https://www.gov.za/speeches/public-enterprise-implementing-saa-business-rescue-plan-12-aug-2020-
 0000, accessed on 15 September 2020. 
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CHAPTER 4 
I INTRODUCTION  
With regard to whether the requirements have resulted in the successful implementation of 
the process, it is noted that with business rescue, we tend to consider the failures rather than 
the successes. The CIPC provides an overview of the statistics regarding business rescue 
proceedings. The CIPC regulates business rescue and is governed by s 185(1) of the 2008 
Act.1  
In terms of a report by the CIPC on the status of business rescue proceedings as at 31 
October 2020, out of the 3818 cases for which business rescue proceedings were commenced 
(from May 2011 to October 2020), 675 proceedings were substantially implemented by way 
of filing a ‘notice of substantial implementation of business rescue plan’ (in terms of s 152(8) 
of the 2008 Act).2 Despite the low rate of success at present (17 per cent), the process is an 
improvement from its precursor (judicial management).  
One of the most significant differences is the administration of the procedure. With 
the former, an applicant would need to receive a provisional and final order in order to enable 
the process.3 Business rescue offers two gateways to enter the process, and there is no need to 
approach the court twice. This is indicative of a more accessible, time–saving, and cost–
effective mechanism that seeks to save companies at an early stage, instead of when it is too 
late.4 
The objective of this chapter is to provide recommendations for the shortcomings of 
business rescue. It mainly discusses recommendations for the two main recovery 
requirements to begin the process (financial distress and a reasonable prospect) as well as the 
implications of PCF and a moratorium, inter alia. 
 
1  ‘The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) manual in terms of s 14 of the 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000’ available at http://www.cipc.co.za/files/5215/6620
 /2870/Promotion_of_Access_to_Information.pdf#:~:text=CIPC%20was%20established%20as%20a,
 Companies%20Act%2C%2071%20of%202008, accessed on 22 July 2020. 
2  CIPC ‘Status of business rescue proceedings in South Africa October 2020’ available at 
 http://www.cipc.co.za/files/3616/0490/5024/Status_of_Business_Rescue_Proceedings_in_South_Afric
 a_-_as_at_31_October_2020_v1.0.pdf, accessed on 15 November 2020; s 152(8) of the 2008 Act states 
 that, ‘when the business rescue plan has been substantially implemented, the practitioner must file a 
 notice of the substantial implementation of the business rescue plan.’ 
3  P Kloppers ‘Judicial Management – A corporate rescue mechanism in need of reform?’ (1999) 10 Stell 
 LR 362–363. 
4  As opposed to judicial management that required a distressed company to be already insolvent. 
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II CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
(a) Financial Distress  
In Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd5 the court found that a company that 
was already insolvent should be liquidated relative to a rescue process.6 However, the court in 
Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd7 held that when determining this requirement, it 
should not be viewed as automatically excluding companies that are already insolvent or are 
experiencing illiquidity from bringing a business rescue application.8  
Essentially, the former interpretation would go against the purpose of the process to 
ensure an efficient rescue that balances the rights and interests of all stakeholders (s 7(d) of 
the 2008 Act).9 Automatically excluding insolvent companies would accelerate job losses and 
immediate debt repayment, instead of allowing them the opportunity to prove a reasonable 
prospect of their (restructured) business activities, securing better returns than an imminent 
liquidation (as an alternative objective).10 
In terms of s 129(3)(a) of the 2008 Act, after a resolution is instituted, a notification 
must be distributed from its effective date to its stakeholders (together with a notice attesting 
the credibility of the grounds on which the resolution was founded). Senior BRPs have 
recommended a ‘pre–assessment’ prior to the commencement of business rescue, as to avoid 
personal liability on boards.  
First, the pre–assessment could assist with determining whether a company is 
financially distressed and whether there is a reasonable prospect of success (a commercially 
viable company).11 Secondly, before the actual administration of business rescue, a company 
has an objective preview of the plan.12 Thirdly, this evaluation will decrease the number of 
 
5  (2013) ZAGPJHC 109 (‘Merchant West’).  
6  Ibid para 8. 
7  2017 (3) SA 74 (WCC) (‘Tyre Corporation’). 
8  Ibid paras 15–16. 
9  M F Cassim, ‘South African Airways makes an emergency landing into business rescue: Some burning 
 issues’ (2020) SALJ 203–204; Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced 
 Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd (ZAGPJHC) unreported case no 13/12406 of 10 
 May 2013 (‘Merchant West’) para 8; Redpath Mining SA (Pty) Ltd v Marsden (2013) ZAGPJHC 148 
 para 47; Tyre Corporation supra note 7 para 15. 
10  Ibid at 204.  
11  ‘Business Rescue Pre–Assessment’ available at https://matusonassociates.co.za/services/assessments/
 business-rescue-pre-assessment/, accessed on 02 November 2020; E Levenstein ‘Business rescue in 
 South Africa: shortcomings, suggestions and possible amendments to Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies 
 Act’ (2018) CR 10. 
12   ‘Business Rescue Pre–Assessment’ available at https://matusonassociates.co.za/services/assessments/
 business-rescue-pre-assessment/, accessed on 02 November 2020 
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entities put into business rescue, in that way, expanding the likelihood of success.13 Fourthly, 
it will decrease the number of business rescues being converted into liquidation. Finally, it 
will cut the excessive costs linked with failed business rescues.14  
Furthermore, the following recommendations, from a finance perspective, could assist 
the courts and BRPs in their determination. Du Toit, Pretorius, and Smith submit, inter alia, 
the ‘financial ratios analysis’ and general ‘cash–flow ratios’ approach as tools to determine 
whether a company is financially distressed.15 As mentioned in Welman v Marcelle Props,16 
‘distressed relates to an ailing company and not the terminally nor the chronically ill.’17 A 
financial–ratios analysis can be a variant used in determining the ratio between a financially 
sound company and an ailing company.18 
Accordingly, the investigation would need to be compared to companies operating in 
the specific industry as the distressed company. Essentially, the comparison is made upon the 
yardstick of that industry, size of the enterprise, and the present market conditions.19 The 
analysis of ratios is reliant on the data collected (financial statistics) being reliable, 
succeeding viability tests, and possibly due diligence.20  
The ‘cash–flow ratio’ approach is a tool used to calculate and confirm that the 
company is financially distressed.21 The tool is useful when certain pre–conditions are 
satisfied. The first step would be to compare the ‘norms’ of the industry the company 
operates in against the median over three years or at least that average.22 Subsequently, the 
financial reports used to calculate the norms must be of a similar commercial environment.  
For example, a comparison of a company in a third–world country against a 
developed country would be idle, as well as the comparison of companies operating in 
disparate sectors.23 Finally, a larger company cannot be compared to a smaller business. 
 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
15  A C Du Toit, M Pretorius, & W Rosslyn-Smith ‘Small, medium and micro enterprises’ distress and 
 factual evaluation of rescue feasibility’ (2019) 11(1) Southern African Journal of Entrepreneurship and 
 Small Business Management at 6–7, available at https://doi.org/10.4102/sajesbm.v11i1.149, 
 accessed on 17 October 2020. 
16  (2012) ZAGPJHC 32 (‘Welman’). 
17  Ibid para 2.  
18  Du Toit, Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 15 at 7. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid at 8. 
22  Ibid.  
23  Ibid. See also L Jooste ‘Cash flow as a yardstick for evaluating financial performance in African 
 businesses’ (2006) 32(7) Journal of Managerial Finance 569–579, available at https://doi. 
 org/10.1108/03074350610671566, accessed on 17 October 2020. 
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Furthermore, the cash–flow statements will show and affirm the company is in financial 
distress and not directly a reasonable prospect (of rescue).24 
(b) Reasonable prospect  
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, this requirement is subject to interpretational 
problems as there is no specific threshold mentioned in the 2008 Act. In Propspec 
Investments (Pty) Ltd25 it is noted that although the term is not defined, it does not relate to a 
‘reasonable possibility’.26 It is substantiated on reasonable grounds and not ‘speculative 
suggestions’ or ‘vague averments’. Evident from the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties,27 
the test is often a subjective examination based on the personal opinion of a BRP, or the 
respondents, on whether the company should be rescued or liquidated.28  
Accordingly, it lacks the formal context of objective facts that can be used to support 
it from a business viewpoint.29 Consequently, when determining a reasonable prospect, an 
objective or subjective test must not be applied rigidly, and the feasible approach would be a 
subjective test on the firm and proven objective business facts.30 The assessment of this 
requirement must be viewed through the lens of a ‘reasonable businessman’. The query 
would then be 
‘whether a reasonable, experienced businessman in that particular field would conclude that 
there is a reasonable prospect of success given the objective proved and not disputed facts.’31 
 Southern Palace Investments,32 Koen,33 Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd,34 Propspec 
Investments (Pty) Ltd,35 and Oakdene Square Properties36 point out that the essential 
requirement to satisfy a reasonable prospect (of rescue) would be to provide information that 
is ‘factual, objective, ascertainable and concrete.’  
 
24  Du Toit, Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 15 at 8.  
25  2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) (‘Propspec Investments’). 
26  Ibid para 12.  
27  2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) (‘Oakdene Square SCA’). 
28  Ibid. 
29  Du Toit, Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 15 at 4. 
30  K Braatvedt ‘Is the test for reasonable prospect objective or subjective?’ available at https://www.tma-
 sa.com/info-centre/item/223-is-the-test-for-reasonable-prospect-objective-or-subjective.html, accessed 
 on 10 June 2020. 
31  Ibid. 
32  2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (‘Southern Palace Investments’). 
33  Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd 2013 (1) SA 191 (WCC) (‘Koen’). 
34  t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 (4) All SA 590 (WCC)
 (‘Zoneska’). 
35  Propspec Investments supra note 25. 
36  Oakdene Square SCA supra note 27. 
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In addition to the submissions made in Chapter 2, the following recommendations 
could be of secondary assistance in determining the threshold of a reasonable prospect. Du 
Toit, Pretorius, and Smith submit that the following methods to ascertain the requirement in 
light of small, medium and micro–enterprises (‘SMMEs’) under constricted timelines.37  
From a business management viewpoint, the determination of a profit–making 
company must be established by a BRP assessing whether all the aspects required of a 
profitable enterprise is present after the proceedings have been terminated.38 These aspects 
can be defined by basic business management and entrepreneurial principles. The essential 
aspects must be proved at the start of the process, whereas some can be introduced later in the 
proceedings. 39  
The first method is an ‘opportunity analysis’ (‘OA’). An OA aims to gather ‘whether 
an opportunity exists for doing meaningful business.’ This method was initiated when 
researching prospects for new businesses and the sale and purchase of existing companies.40 
Du Toit, Pretorius, and Smith consider this as a tool to establish a reasonable prospect for 
companies in financial distress, and that start–ups and rescue situations are similar and could 
thus contribute to understanding the disputed requirement.41 
With an OA, the components of a company are divided into five core business model 
groups, namely: (1) demand for concept offering (value propositions); (2) team; (3) 
resources; (4) competitive environment (profitability); and (5) finance.42  
The analytical approach for a company in financial distress could use the same 
principles and identify the problem areas. The OA uses a feasibility perspective to establish a 
reasonable prospect. Hence, it looks at whether the essential requirements are satisfied at the 
precise time for the restructured company.43  
The second method is the ‘do we have a business?’ test (‘DWaB test’), which has 
developed on the details of the feasibility principles and the OA. Essentially, five questions 
signify the features required for the company to exist and would be answered by a 
‘reasonable and experienced businessperson’.44 Despite an attempt by Eloff AJ in Southern 
 
37  Du Toit, Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 15 at 2 
38  Ibid at 6. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid, see also J A Timmons & S Spinelli New venture creation: Entrepreneurship for the 21st century 
 6 ed (2003). 
41  Du Toit, Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 15 at 6. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. 
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Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd45 to guide the concept with a checklist that arguably ‘set the 
bar too high’, the following questions encompassed in this test are more broad and objective 
in nature.46 They are: 
‘(1)  Whether there is demand for the product and/or service. This refers directly to the 
concept offering and the significance of the demand for this. This demand can be 
defined as the utility of goods or service from an economic agent.  
(2)  Does the capacity exist to deliver on the demand? Capacity can also be described as 
the output capability over a specific period, infrastructure and the human resource 
capacity. 
(3)  Is there a profitable business case in motion? This question refers to the reasoning 
behind initiating the business or project and whether there is economic logic 
supporting the business model.  
(4)  Are the cash–flow projections positive? This can be described as the amount of 
liquidity moving through the business and/or the ability of the business to pay 
immediate creditors.  
(5)  Are there potential flaws (caveats) in the business model that may render the other 
factors useless?  
These caveats can be any constraints to the optimal functioning of the business. These 
questions are progressive in that a negative answer to one can have an eliminating 
power.’47 
The OA and the DWaB test are objective (factual) methods that focus on the 
feasibility requirement, which must subsequently be examined through due diligence and 
validity testing.48  
(c) Moratorium  
As discussed in Chapter 3, once the main requirements to commence business rescue are 
satisfied, one main legal consequence is a general moratorium, or a stay on debts and 
liabilities, that may be claimed from the distressed company. During this interval, a BRP is 
planning a business rescue plan to enable the success of the rescue process. The moratorium 
is of ‘cardinal’ importance in the whole process.49   
 
45  Southern Palace Investments supra note 32. 
46  Ibid para 28. 
47  Du Toit, Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 15 at 6. 
48  Ibid, see also L F Gillman Due diligence: A financial and strategic approach (2001). 
49  F H I Cassim (ed), M F Cassim, R Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 879. 
49 
Initially, before an application is made to commence business rescue, there is a 
statutory obligation on the board to send a notification to all stakeholders once the distressed 
company has established that they are financially distressed in terms of s 129(7) of the 2008 
Act. In the event of the company not pursuing the resolution after they have reasonable 
grounds to do so, they must provide notification to affected persons on their reasons, and this 
provides the stakeholders with an opportunity to make a court application.50  
However, in the absence of a moratorium, this obligation can be detrimental as it 
could lead to creditors demanding payments, suppliers cancelling business, labour actions 
instituted by employees together with trade unions, and this is likely to result in a possible 
and immediate liquidation.51 
In addition to the negative domino effect, when a distressed company continues to do 
business (i.e. continues trading) and fails to abide by the above provision, they are 
accountable for the losses sustained.52 For example, when a shareholder, unaware of its 
status, continues to do business with the financially distressed company and is later left with 
no security,53 the board may be regarded as ‘reckless’ and charged with gross negligence.54  
However, a company is protected under a civil claim in terms of s 22(1) and s 218(2) 
if they were diligent in understanding whether or not the company is financially distressed 
and, on this knowledge, optioned not to send the notification in good faith.55  
Section 77(9) of the 2008 Act (the business judgement rule or ‘BJR’) acts as a 
safeguard against personal liability of directors where their decisions were reasonable and 
sincere.56 In essence, the BJR is to permit the complete exercise of duties by directors, 
exclusive of such exposure.57 Likewise, a possible reason why directors of a distressed 
company opt to continue trading and are reluctant to file for business rescue is because of the 
predicament the boards face when battling to weigh–up the risk of trading recklessly to the 
 
50  Section 129(7) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
51  A Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law 
 (unpublished PhD thesis, University of South Africa, 2010) 66. 
52  Section 218(2) of the 2008 Act. 
53  D Kotzé ‘Catch 22 Directors’ duties under s 129(7) of the Companies Act (2013) De Rebus 42—43 
 available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/84.html, accessed on 12 August 2020. 
54  Section 22(1) of the 2008 Act. 
55  E Levenstein An Appraisal of the New South African Business Rescue Procedure (published LLD 
 thesis, University of Pretoria, 2015) 322. 
56  K Weyers & J Osmond ‘Beyond the balance sheet: Considering directors’ liability in financially 
 distressed times’ 7 April 2020 available at https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/en/news/publications/
 2020/dispute/business-rescue-newsletter-7-april-Beyond-the-balance-sheet-considering-directors-
 liability-in-financially-distressed-times.html, accessed on 4 November 2020. 
57  Ibid. 
50 
risk of giving up their powers to a BRP which may not factually be in the best interests on the 
company.  
Essentially, a BRP does not have an accurate idea on the operations and monetary 
dealings of the ailing company. Hence, he or she would not be able to fully participate in 
understanding all the particulars of the business. To remove the current BOD when the 
company needs them the most could be inimical. Hence, the solution would be to allow the 
board to work alongside the BRP to achieve a successful restructure.58 
(d) Post–commencement finance  
In National Labor Relations Board v Bildisco & Bildisco,59 the court commented that an 
important objective of restructuring is to avoid the liquidation of the debtor–company due to 
consequent loss of jobs and the likely exploitation of monetary funds. A successful 
restructure may only occur in some cases where new creditors fuel the distressed company 
with further funds.60 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the courts have drawn parallels between the ability to 
secure post–commencement financing (PCF) and the requirement of a reasonable prospect 
being met. Accordingly, an unwritten rule by BRPs suggests that ‘no PCF means no 
reasonable prospect for rescue unless proven otherwise.’61 In A G Petzetakis International 
Holdings Ltd62 the court denied the rescue application on the basis that there were no 
reasonable prospect of success and no evidence (from its founding papers) that the process 
would result in better returns for creditors than liquidation. The rescue was dependent on a 
substantial amount of financial injection (PCF), which was not signalled in its papers of how 
it would be forthcoming.63 
 
58  E Levenstein ‘Opportunities for investors arising from the South African business rescue process’ 6 
 May 2020 available at https://www.werksmans.com/legal-updates-and-opinions/opportunities-for-
 investors-arising-from-the-south-african-business-rescue-process/, accessed on 15 May 2020. See also 
 C Els, M Yudaken, L Kahn et al ‘Webinar: Sustaining businesses in challenging times’ 10 June 2020 
 available at https://www.webberwentzel.com/News/Pages/webinar-sustaining-businesses-in-
 challenging-times.aspx, accessed on 20 June 2020.  
59  US 513 (1984) 528 (‘Bildisco’).    
60  Cassim op cit note 49 at 882. 
61  M Pretorius ‘Business Rescue: Status Quo report: Final Report’ Business Enterprises – University of 
 Pretoria 2015 available at https://static.pmg.org.za/151110Business_Rescue.pdf 46, accessed on 16 
 September 2020. 
62  v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) (‘A G Petzetakis’). 
63  Ibid para 19. 
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The lack of agility of companies to acquire PCF is one explanation for business rescue 
applications failing.64 The challenge to raise financing through loans could be barred as these 
institutions require unencumbered assets (such as surety) and would be more cautious in 
extending finance to distressed companies.65 
Section 135 of Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act provides for PCF, which ranks in preference 
to existing unsecured claims against the distressed company. This is an incentive to raise 
finance and encourage creditors to extend funding in exchange for ‘super–priority status’.66 
Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd67 confirmed the order of preference in 
the process, and it is evident that the secured and post–commencement financiers would rank 
before the secured lenders prior the start of a rescue plan.68  
Accordingly, while under business rescue, a company must be able to discharge its 
present operational and financial obligations to exist, or else it would subsequently be 
liquidated. This also applies when an investor is acquiring the company.69 
As discussed in Chapter 3, PCF can be extended by banks or the companies’ 
shareholders (existing lenders). In addition, a potential investor could proffer PCF during an 
acquisition process. Essentially, this is a strategic option under the Companies Act. Under 
business rescue, financially distressed companies are desirable to international and domestic 
investors as the company, or its core assets, can be purchased at a bargain through an 
acquisition.70  
The business rescue plan will include the final acquisition proposal after it is voted on 
by creditors and shareholders (if affected). The proposed restructure could either vary from 
the sale of assets or shares to the company being sold.71 An example of a company that has 
been successfully restructured through an acquisition of its business (under business rescue) 
 
64  W Du Preez ‘Post–commencement finance: The silver bullet for business rescue?’ Business Rescue 
 Exchange available at https://www.brexchange.co.za/pcm-silver-bullet/, accessed on 22 September 
 2020. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Cassim op cit note 49 at 884; s 135(2) of the 2008 Act. 
67  Merchant West supra note 9 para 21. 
68  Ibid. 
69  Levenstein op cit note 58. 
70  E Levenstein ‘Opportunities for Chinese investors arising from the new business rescue provisions of 
 the South African Companies Act 2008’ available at https://www.werksmans.com/legal-updates-and-
 opinions/opportunities-for-chinese-investors-arising-from-the-new-business-rescue-provisions-of-the-
 south-african-companies-act-2008/, accessed on 16 October 2020. 
71  Ibid.  
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is Pearl Valley Golf Estate.72 During 2011 and due to declining market conditions in the golf 
estate industry, the distressed company was acquired by Standard Bank in 2013.73  
In 2015, Pearl Valley was placed first in the residential estate category in South 
Africa by New World Wealth after effective management and improvements made by the 
bank.74 Other successful companies that were under business rescue and thereafter acquired 
by third–parties for successful restructure include:  
‘Southgold Mine (acquired by Witsgold), Top TV (acquired by a Chinese company Star Sat), 
Meltz Success (acquired by the Hub), Advanced Technologies & Engineering (Aeronautical) 
Engineering (acquired by Paramount), Moyo Restaurants (acquired by Fournews), Optimum 
Coal Mine (acquired by Tegeta) and SA Calcium Carbide (management buy–out).’75  
Likewise, PCF is critical for the continuation of business operations, which preserves 
the value of the company. Without it, there would be nothing left to acquire.76 
III CONCLUSION  
A pandemic like Covid–19 has blindsided many companies and regrettably accelerated 
defaults that resulted in more companies in South Africa experiencing financial difficulty. 
Chapter 3 focused on the current case discussion of SAA under voluntary business rescue. 
Despite the airline suffering financial setbacks before the pandemic, the aviation industry was 
adversely affected due to the national– and international travel bans under lockdown.  
A BR plan for SAA was released on 16 June 2020 subject to amendments. It is 
implicitly anticipated in the Companies Act of 2008 that a business rescue process should end 
within ninety days, subject to the extension of time granted by the court.77 Should the 
proceedings extend over three months, the BRPs must prepare progress reports coupled with 
an update of each subsequent month until the rescue plan had ended.78  
Reflecting on the delays and the extension of certain aspects of the business rescue 
process for a large airline like SAA, it is recommended that this period be extended to seven 
 
72 ‘Mantis and Val de vie acquire Pearl Valley Golf and Country Estate’ Business Events Africa 4 
 December 2015 available at https://www.businesseventsafrica.com/2015/12/04/mantis-and-val-de-vie-
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months (for larger corporations) and five months for medium–sized businesses.79 Likewise, 
the business rescue process for SAA commenced on 5 December 2019 and is still ongoing.   
At present, numerous private equity partners have come forward to invest in the 
airline, on the condition that they would be absolved from paying the airline debts and 
restructuring expenses.80 The progression of this transaction is anticipated to be either during 
December 2020 or the first quarter of 2021.81 According to Fadugba, ‘there is inherent value 
in an existing airline which cannot be easily replicated in a new replacement carrier’ and 
consequently a reason to keep SAA in existence through the option of investments from a 
private equity partner.82  
Moreover, the requirements to commence the rescue process for public companies are 
the same as private companies, however, the courts must apply a higher threshold in 
determining if there is a viable business before allowing a business rescue proceeding to 
commence. If the company is not commercially feasible, it would be burdening to the fiscus 
to place the ailing public company into business rescue. 
Accordingly, a distressed company should only consider business rescue once they 
have decided on a plan to exit the process. The plan could entail recapitalisation or the order 
to discharge its debts. ‘Business rescue offers a framework, not a solution.’ 83 Also, the legal 
moratorium, the temporary suspension, or cancellation of contracts by a BRP, and the 
requirement of post–commencement financing will not inevitably remedy the reasons a 
company is in distress. It simply offers a framework and a period for the company to find 
solutions to recover.84 
 
79  Levenstein op cit note 55 at 626.  
80  ‘Gordhan: Private equity partners will not take on SAA's debt or restructuring costs’ News24Wire 12 
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